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Summary  findings
The government of Hungary has contained the main  behalf of government) organized after privatization to
fiscal risks of the transition to a market economy. It has  support, first, industries and, later, exporters. The
paid off and resolved most problems in the banking and  government has dealt with these new programs of
enterprise sectors. Since 1995 it has implemented fiscal  contingent government support prudently and
adjustment with the objective of long-term fiscal stability  transparently, with reasonable ceilings on (and reporting
rather than an immediate deficit target. The main result  of) risks.
has been pension reform, which has raised temporary  Hungary is likely to face pressure for additional
deficits but reduced the long-term public liability. Only  spending. Priorities in fiscal policy should include
the health sector awaits the reform needed for long-term  reforming health financing, establishing checks on
fiscal stability.  hidden subsidies in guarantee programs, and determining
Levels of government spending, budget deficits, and  the government's optimal exposure to risk.
public service remain high, but the government has made  In terms of institutions, the government should aim to
great progress toward rationalizing public spending and  create a more flexible, responsive budget process and
improving the management of budget and off-budget  greater capacity to analyze medium-term fiscal risks, to
fiscal risks.  build a more results-oriented budget management
In the transition, the government has taken on new  system, and to improve mechanisms for sharing risk
fiscal risks - mainly state guarantees and growing  between the public and private sectors under government
programs of credit and guarantee agencies (operating on  programs.
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21.  CONSIDERING  FISCAL  RISKS:  PRINCIPLES  AND
FUTURE  CHALLENGES
Introduction
In  transitional  countries,  fiscal  adjustment  sprawls  across  all  sectors  of  the
economy. Adjustment entails liquidating failing enterprises, privatizing sound ones, and
creating the conditions under which new firms can enter the market and old  ones can
expand; restoring financial health to banks by injecting new capital, resolving bad debts,
and  strengthening  bank  supervision;  regulating  the  issuance  of  new  guarantees  and
providing  adequate  financing  for  old  ones;  recognizing  the accrued  liabilities  of the
pension system and containing the buildup of new liabilities; and more.
Fiscal adjustment has not been easy in Hungary, nor has it been without risk to the
country's  future economic stability. The transformation to a market-driven economy has
impelled the government to deal with a stockpile of inherited, long-buried obligations and
liabilities, while taking on new commitments to promote development and stabilize social
conditions. For the most part, the government has dealt with old and new fiscal risks in a
prudent,  disciplined manner-liquidating  many  accrued  liabilities,  making  remaining
ones more transparent, and taking on new fiscal commitments within the fiscal aggregates
set by the budget. To the extent it has acted in this manner, Hungary's  fiscal adjustment
has been real, not illusory, and the burden of past and ongoing risks on future budgets has
been diminished. But the adjustment has not yet been completed, and Hungary needs to
take additional steps to bolster its fiscal prospects.
Until late 1980s, similarly to the other former socialist economies, Hungary hid its
true fiscal condition  in  a  maze  of administered deceptions.  Taxes were  embedded  in
prices,  enterprise  losses  were  hidden  by  subsidies,  financial  institutions  concealed
insolvency by overstating the value of assets, social insurance schemes were supplied
cash to cover current payments but little provision was made for long-term commitments,
health (and other public services) were financed through normative grants that veiled the
relative cost and quality of services.
As a  result, enormous unrecognized costs  and liabilities  accumulated to  surface
only later, during the transition.  First, in  the early  1990s, this  trend contributed to the
large fiscal deficits and debt increases. As true fiscal adjustment and structural reforms
had been postponed,  in the late  1994 the fiscal  outlook lost  sustainability.  The  1995
massive reform package for fiscal adjustment started with budgetary cuts (wages, public
employment,  sick pay,  family  allowances,  education). The government  also  launched
efforts  to  develop  institutions,  particularly  the  treasury  function  in  budget
implementation,  to  support  aggregate  fiscal  control.  Consequently,  the  public
expenditure/GDP ratio declined by 11 percent during 1994-97.
3Whether to recognize and pay for the liabilities accumulated in the past has been a
key  issue faced by Hungary and  other transitional countries.  Some governments have
sought to postpone  the day of reckoning in the hope  that economic improvement will
make adjustment less painful in the future, only to find that the expected growth has not
been forthcoming or not as robust as hoped for. Some have been slow or half-hearted in
removing  subsidies or  in privatizing state enterprises, only to  find that the losses and
liabilities have continued to  pile up, and  that rather than recovering, the economy has
languished.
With  some  notable  exceptions,  Hungary  generally has  taken  a  different  track,
making  the  implicit  liabilities  accumulated  in  the  past  and  the  costs  of  adjustment
explicit, and paying these costs in current budgets, as well as establishing  institutions
which would ensure transparency and fiscal discipline in the future. It has reformed the
pension  system,  consolidated  the  banking  sector  and  privatized  most  banks  and
enterprises, resolved the risks of inter-government finances, detached public spending and
debt  from  the  books  of  the National  Bank  of  Hungary,  and  modernized  its  budget
management and tax systems. These measures have brought public  finances on a path
sustainable in the long term. In effect, Hungary has cut most of its past losses, enabling
both the government and entrepreneurs to build new economic institutions that bode well
for the country's future.
But in transitioning to an open, market-driven economy, the government has taken
on new risks to  stimulate development, rebuild the country's  deteriorated infrastructure,
stabilize financial institutions, and encourage capital inflows. Directly or through various
intermediaries, the government of Hungary has guaranteed loans to private enterprises, it
has provided guarantees to various institutions such as reserve and guarantee funds and it
has ensured participants in the new pension scheme a minimum return. Moreover, the
government has not liquidated all past risks, for it still maintains a portfolio  of state-
owned enterprises, retains an ownership interest in several banks, and has failed to create
cost-saving incentives in the health system while providing an open-ended guarantee to
deliver the best available health care to all Hungarians according to their needs.
As  Hungary's economic condition  has  improved,  some  disquieting  signs have
emerged of the government's greater willingness to take risks that were avoided during
the early transitional period. While these do not yet threaten its overall fiscal sturdiness,
they bear close watch. One disturbing sign is the use of state  financial institutions to
assist troubled  enterprises;  another is the  increased volume of  high-risk  guarantees to
protect or expand export markets; as third is the evolution of APVrt, the privatization
agency, from an institution whose overriding responsibility was to dispose of state-owned
assets into one that maintains a portfolio of such assets and uses its cash  flow (at the
behest of the  government) to  provide off-budget guarantees  or assistance;  a  fourth  is
pressure on the government to  accept financial responsibility  for a number of implicit
guarantees or expectations. These may turn out  to be transitory problems, but they do
indicate how difficult it can be to complete the transition  from  a state-controlled to a
market-based economy.
4Principles
In liquidating old obligations and undertaking new ones, the government has been
guided by two principles: explicit risks should be identified, and to the extent feasible, its
exposure  should  be  assessed;  and  risk  should  be  reduced  and  contained  within  the
approved fiscal framework. The first principle is transparency, the second is containment.
Transparency is expressed in a number of policies and actions: the risks and costs
of past policies should be explicit, and, where appropriate, funds should be set aside to
pay for them. For example, the commitments embedded in social security benefits should
be measured and financed in the budget. Moreover, when the government takes on new
risks, prospective  costs  should be  estimated. While laudable, transparency  may entail
political  costs,  for  it  reveals  to  citizens  costs  and  problems  which  have  long  been
concealed.  Transparency  is  difficult  to  fully  implement  because,  first,  many
commitments are implicit  and based  on expectations rather than legal obligations,  and
second, it is hard to estimate the downstream costs of contingent liabilities. Transparency
is easiest to enforce when the obligations are direct and explicit, and hardest when they
are implicit and contingent (see Part 2).
At  time  the  government  has  paid  a  heavy  price  for  deviating  from  the
transparency  rule. For  various  reasons,  the government  of Hungary  was  reluctant  to
address the deteriorating fiscal condition of Postabank, an institution which was almost
entirely privately-owned at the start of transition, but over the course of the decade has
become almost wholly state owned. The lesson from this costly episode is simple but
important: while transparency may be difficult to uphold, violating this principles often
makes matters worse.
In upholding transparency, the government of Hungary boosted independence of
the National Bank of Hungary, releasing the central bank from its earlier responsibilities
for financing of fiscal deficits and parts of the (unreported) public  debt. Sometimes the
government has appeared to be taking on new risks when all it has done has been to set
aside  resources  to  finance  previously  hidden  commitrnents.  For  example,  bank
consolidation was paid from the budget and sovereign debt issues; and in reforming the
pension  system, the government  has budgeted resources  to  cover unfunded "accrued"
obligations of workers who switch to the new partly privatized system.
Containment It is not sufficient for a government to disclose risks; it also must
manage  them,  that  is,  limit  its  financial  exposure  and  take  on new  risks  within its
approved budget framework. In Hungary, the government has contained many old risks
by liquidating them. In privatizing enterprises and financial institutions, the government
has had to disclose losses and liabilities and either pay these off or transfer the obligation
to  the  new  owners.  Subsequently,  bank  privatization  and  tight  bank  regulation  and
supervision have enabled the government to contain major contingent fiscal risks of the
banking sector. To prepare for possible fiscal risks, the government has created multiple
5reserve funds, such as a deposit insurance reserve fund, a guarantee fund for pension
funds, and a state guarantee  fund in the state budget  which  adequacy  is supervised  by the
State Audit  Office.
Containment also applies to  new risks taken by  the government during the
transitional  period.  The national government  also has contained  the potential spill-overs
of obligations  from subnational  governments  by making them subject  to strict bankruptcy
law, legal borrowing limits and, in case of the sizeable' subnational  governments,  to
regular state audit. The pension refonrn  has reduced the accrued benefits in the public
pension system and the total size of government  pension liabilities  in the medium and
long term. The Public Finance Act requires that guarantees  be set forth in the budget
which limits  the amounts  that may  be tendered  during  the financial  year and also provides
for the costs of existing  guarantees  that may be called during  the year.
Future Challenges
The true test of fiscal risk comes when the economy  is faltering,  not when growth
is robust, things appear to be going right and confidence  is high. Promises of contingent
support appear inexpensive  as long as the economy  is functioning  well, however, they
will generate,  sudden  pressures  on the budget  if the economy  weakens. There is no such
thing as  risk-free development. The process of  building a  country, developing its
infrastructure, and  improving public  services entails the  taking of  risks  by  both
entrepreneurs  and government.  Even if  the latter were to  refrain from guaranteeing
private transactions,  it would  likely be compelled  to intervene  if the country's economic
future  was jeopardized  by failing  enterprises  and weak financial  institutions.
Despite  the largely successful  adjustment,  the government  of Hungary  still faces
some  fiscal risks, far greater  than  those typically  encountered  in developed  countries.  The
elevated risk is  partly due to  the  thinness and  fragility of  its capital markets, its
dependence  on capital inflows, and vulnerability  to sudden outflows. In taking on new
risks  and holding on  to  old  ones,  government leaders are  betting that  economic
management  and the positive impact  of the EU accession  process will sustain growth and
investor  confidence  for the next 5-7 years. But 5-7 years is a long stretch, and Hungary
may not have as much time to complete  its fiscal adjustment as it needs and expects.
Further weakening of emerging market economies would spur more calls on  state
guarantees.  Even though the total amount of calls was low in the past, this expectation
signals that any significant  weakening  of the economy  may leave the government  with
commitments  made in good times that are difficult  to cover  when adversity  strikes.
According  to the Act on Local Government  (1990/65)  only  governments  of the counties,  cities  with
county  rights,  the capital  city  and district  of the capital  city are obliged  to have an audited annual
balance  sheet. In addition,  local  governments  which  annual  expenditure  is above HUF 1  OOmn  and
have an accumulated  debt stock  or are about to borrow  need  to call an official  auditor.
6Beyond macroeconomic performance, three types of risks warrant concern. One is
that fiscal adjustment still is far from complete. With public expenditures near 50 percent
of GDP and the budget deficit hovering near 4 percent of GDP, Hungary may face greater
risk than some neighbors which have smaller public sectors and smaller deficits. Hungary
has made significant progress in right sizing the public sector and in aligning revenues
and expenditures, but much remains to be done.
Second, the government of Hungary has not liquidated all inherited risks; it still
retains some state enterprises, maintains an ownership interest in some weak banks, and
is burdened by a health care system whose services are regarded as inadequate and whose
revenue increasingly fails to cover growing expenditures.
Third, the government has taken on a portfolio of new risks. To some extent, the
government  has  replaced  the  old  system  of  enterprise  subsidies,  by  promises  of
contingent  support.  State  guarantees  have  supported  selected enterprises,  banks  and
farmers.  More  recently,  specialized  credit  and  guarantee  agencies,  for  which  the
government has assumed limited obligation, have been expanding particularly to promote
exports.  New risks also  include  the normative pension  guarantee in  the new pension
system and macroeconomic uncertainties arising from fiscal decentralization.
Finally, implicit commitments, or pressure on the government to assist individuals
or entities who have not succeeded in the market, emerge from time to time. In the late
1990s,  these have included for example demands that the government indemnify workers
who  lost  their jobs  after  the  state  enterprise  in  which  they  worked  was  privatized.
Furthermore, there was pressure on the government to assist enterprises which borrowed
to  build  privately  financed  infrastructure  (such  as  highways)  when  revenues  do  not
suffice to  cover debt service. In  addition, depositors in government-sponsored  savings
schemes have demanded restitution when actual retums have not been as high as they
expected. The common element in these examples is that the government does not have
an explicit commitment, but may nevertheless face fiscal risks.
All countries come face to face with implicit risks that were previously ignored or
unknown. The tendency may be greater in transition countries because of the inclination
of enterprises and individuals  to look  to government  for assistance. There may be  no
permanent  remedy  for  implicit  risks,  but  the  more  government  accepts  the  moral
obligation, the more it will be obligated in the future. The best course, therefore, may be
for government to wean firms and citizens from the expectation that it will rescue them
by refusing to do so.
To  ensure  continued  fiscal  stability  as  required  in  the  EU  accession,  the
government needs to continue to reduce its exposure to fiscal risks. For this it will need to
build new capacities to deal with risk. In its choices whether to finance particular outputs
or guarantee that the private sector would attain desired outcomes, the government should
continue to favor transparency and predictability of future public financing requirements.
7This paper explores fiscal risks that have remained or emerged during the 1995-97
fiscal  adjustment  in  Hungary.  It  details  how  the  government  has  handled  risks  of
transition  and  explains  the  different  the  attributes  of  these  risks. 2 The  next  section
summarizes the fiscal risks and their main sources faced by the government in Hungary.
On a sector-by-sector basis the third section concentrates on the channels through which
the  1995-97 fiscal adjustment dealt  with  fiscal risks.  The fourth  section  looks at the
developments in public  finance management  system in  Hungary and  the treatment  of
fiscal  risks in  this  system.  The  final section  summarizes the  potential  claims  on  the
budget that are likely to emerge from the existing fiscal risks in the near future and offers
an agenda for the future.
2.  THE FISCAL RISKS MATRIX
This  section  identifies,  classifies  and  compares  the  largest  sources  of  future
potential  fiscal  risk  in  Hungary. In  this  framework,  developed  by Polackova  (1998),
governments face four types of fiscal risk, each of which is a broadly defined liability that
combines two of the following characteristics: explicit versus implicit and direct versus
contingent. 3
•  Explicit  liabilities  are  specific  obligations  of  the  government  established  by  a
particular law or contract. The government is legally mandated to settle the obligation
when  it comes due.  Common examples  are the repayment  of sovereign debt  and
repayment of nonperforming loans the state has guaranteed.
. Implicit  liabilities  involve  a  moral  obligation  or  expected  responsibility  of  the
government that is established not  by law but  by public expectations and political
pressures. Examples of implicit liabilities are future public pension benefits that are
not specified by law, disaster relief for uninsured victims, and default of a large bank
on nonguaranteed obligations.
*  Direct liabilities are obligations that will arise in any event and are therefore certain.
They are predictable based on some specific underlying factors; they do not depend
(are not contingent) on any discrete event. For example, future public pensions are a
2  See  Annex I for a questionnaire  that  has served  to evaluate  the problem  of government  fiscal  risks
and risk management.
3  The international accounting standards for governments proposed by the International Federation
of Accountants define a liability as a present obligation of the government that entails a form of
economic benefits and that arises from past events whose settlement is expected to result in an
outflow of government resources (International Federation of Accountants 1998).
8direct  liability  whose  size reflects the  expected amount  of the  benefit,  eligibility
factors, and future demographic and economic developments.
Contingent liabilities are obligations triggered by a discrete event that may or may not
occur. 4 The  probability  of  the  contingency  occurring  and  the  magnitude  of  the
government  outlay  required  to  settle  the  ensuing  obligation  may  be  difficult  to
forecast. Relative to government policies, they are exogenous (a natural  disaster or
capital flight) and endogenous (the design of government programs or the quality of
regulations, which both have implications on moral hazard in the markets).
The  fiscal risk  matrix  in  Table  2.1  provides  a  typology  of the  sources of  the
potential financial requirements that are faced by the government of Hungary. There are
four categories of fiscal risks in the matrix, which are defined as a combination of the
above  characteristics.  For  each  category,  the  matrix  lists  government  activities  and
promises that may create significant future fiscal pressures.
4  International  accounting  standards  define  a contingency  as a condition  or situation  whose ultimate
outcome is determined  only by the occurrence,  or nonoccurrence,  of one or more future events
(International  Accounting  Standards  Committee  1997).
9Table 2.1  Possible sources of future financing pressures on the central government
Liabilities  Direct (certain)  Contingent  (if a particular event occurs)
a future health care financing (Health Fund deficits)  . obligations of the state-guaranteed agencies,
Explicit  * future public pension benefits under the new pay-  such as State Development Bank, EXIM Bank,
as-you-go scheme (post-reform transitional  Export-Import Insurance Company, Pension
Government  deficits)  Reserve Fund to cover pension guarantees,
liability is  * future social safety net  Deposit Insurance Fund, Credit Guarantee
liability  isutresoiaFund,  Rural Credit Guarantee Foundation, and
recognized by  * future salaries and benefits of public employees  Office of Agricultural Market Regime
law or contract  * sovereign borrowing (loans contracted and  environment guarantees and other obligations
securities issued by the central government)  of the Privatization Agency (APV Rt)
* pension guarantee to the new fully-funded
pension scheme
* state guarantees issued to public and private
sector entities and local governments
* guarantees on private investments (concessions)
Implicit  * the cost of policies to meet the EU requirements  * obligations of large and politically influential
A "moral"  . military financing requirement of the NATO  banks (Postabank) and enterprises (Railways)
obligation of the  membership  . municipal obligations to provide critical
government that  services
mainly reflects  . indemnification of workers for lost work places
public  in former state owned enterprises
expectations and  *  financial rescue to concessions if revenues
pressures by  do not suffice to cover debt service
interest groups  . development support in depressed regions
(support to large enterprises)
* debt relief and future investment needs under
the housing support programs
. defense of the crawling peg by the National
Bank of Hungary
The liabilities listed in the table refer to the fiscal authorities and not directly to the central bank.
Direct  explicit liabilities  in Hungary mainly comprise of the large public debt,
increasing spending requirement on health care, and transitional benefits under the pay-as
you-go  pillar  of  the  new pension  system.  The  1995-97  fiscal  adjustment  helped  to
stabilize the sovereign debt, temporarily  suppressed health  spending,  and significantly
reduced  the  long-term  public  pension  liability.  But  the  government  still  faces  the
challenge of  reforming the health  system  in  order to  maintain  health  spending  under
check in the long term.
Direct implicit liabilities of the government arise as presumed, rather than as legal
or  contractual,  obligations  of  the  state  are  primarily  established  by  Hungary's
commitment to take on expenditures needed to meet the EU and NATO requirements in
various  sectors.  The government  has  launched  a  detailed  sector-by-sector  analysis to
quantify these implicit obligations.
10Contingent  explicit liabilities,  as legal obligations of the government to  make a
payment if a particular event occurs, are still relatively moderate in Hungary. The main
source of explicit contingent fiscal risk to the government have been state guarantees and
guarantees  and  credits  issued  by  various  agencies  on  behalf  of  the  state.  After
privatization, these programs have increasingly supported Hungarian exports rather than
industries. As  the government has been cautious in designing these programs and the
economy has performed well, the hidden subsidy embedded in these programs has not
fully materialized. The risk and potential  budgetary cost of these programs,  however,
have increased with regard to the possible consequences of international financial crises
for Hungarian banks and enterprises.
Contingent implicit liabilities, which are hidden until after a failure occurs, are no
longer large in Hungary. The largest contingent implicit liability, the banking sector, had
mostly been paid off and brought under control. During 1995-97 Hungary further reduced
its  contingent implicit  liabilities  by  implementing  sound macroeconomic  framework,
good  regulatory  and  supervisory  systems,  information disclosure in  the  markets,  and
inter-government finance reform. Hungary's macroeconomic framework has also reduced
risks that are potentially associated with international private capital flows (such as assets
overvaluation and overgrowing). The remaining contingent implicit risks are primarily
associated with banks and enterprises that have remained under state control.
3.  ANALYZING  SELECTED  AREAS OF RISKS
THE EFFECT OF THE PENSION REFORM ON CONTINGENT GOVERNMENT LIABILITIES'
The aggregate fiscal objective
The  pension  reform  constitutes  one  of  the  most  critical  element  of  fiscal
adjustment in Hungary. The reform introduced in  1997 has sought to  restore the long-
term viability of and to encourage private responsibility for the provision for retirement.
The reform aimed at reducing the prospective cost of the mandatory social security pillar
and at creating a set of privately managed, fully funded, defined contribution funds. As a
result of the reform two pension systems will exist parallel for the next four decades: the
inherited public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, modernized to offer lower benefits and
to require higher retirement age and stricter rules for eligibility; and the new multi-pillar
system, which complements the PAYG scheme with the smaller, fully funded, privately
This section benefited primarily from the contribution of Csaba Feher, Private Pensions Guarantee
Fund, Hungary, and Robert Palacios and Judit Spat, World Bank.
11managed second pillar and a voluntary, fully funded third pillar. 6 Participation in the new
multi-pillar system  is mandatory  for new  entrants in the labor  force and optional  for
individuals already active in the labor force.
The risk of high transitional deficits under the public PAYG scheme
Even though the pension reform reduces both the long-term pension  liability and
fills the initial gap  between assets and liabilities of the government  under the PAYG
scheme, the fiscal effects of the pension  reform look unfavorable  in the conventional,
flow-based analysis of fiscal adjustment in the medium term. That is because, in the early
years after the reform, the transition to the new system generates deficits in the reformed
PAYG. The transition deficits result from the government offering all participants in the
old system an option to switch to the new, multi-pillar system, and taking three quarters
of their contribution to  a private pension fund. 7 This option makes part of the initially
hidden pension liability visible. The size of the visible share of the pension liability and
thus the transition  deficits in the PAYG scheme grow with the numbers  of individuals
switching from  the old to  the new  system, increasing  thus pressure  for  further fiscal
adjustment in state budget. Nevertheless, this is a temporary pressure only as later on the
modernized PAYG system overcompensates the losses.
New, contingent pension liabilities
The pension  reform,  while  reducing  its  long-term  direct  pension  liability,  also
generated  new  contingent  liabilities in  the  form  of  explicit  and  implicit  government
guarantees.  The government introduced  these guarantees to  cover risks of  individuals
under the second, mandatory pillar. The introduction of the guarantees was necessitated
by the fears expressed by the Hungarian public about the market risks of private pension
funds. To build political support to the partial privatization of the pension  system the
question was not  whether to  issue guarantees and thus  create new (contingent) public
liabilities, but rather how to protect individuals against risks without creating excessive
moral hazard in the new system and without exposing the government to excessive risks.
Institutional (such as strict conditions for licensing and management  of pension funds,
State Pension Fund Supervision, portfolio  regulations, rate of  return requirement) and
contingent  guarantees  (so  called  normative  guarantee  and  budget  guarantee  behind
Private Pensions Guarantee Fund') were legislated to reduce the risks of the new pension
system for individuals and the government:
6  For a detailed description of the new system please see Bokros and Dethier,  1998.
The drop of public saving will be offset by an increase in private saving through the second,
mandatory saving pillar.
s  The Guarantee Fund is financed through mandatory membership fees levied on the pension funds.
Its function is, inter alia, to supplement fund member account balances in case these fall short of
the capital required to meet the normative  funding requirement at retirement or the normative
annuity at any time following the retirement, make temporary payments to fund member accounts
in case of short or long term liquidity problems of a pension fund.
12The normative guarantee promises individuals contributing to the second pillar
for at least 180 months an annuity of not less than 25 percent of the value of the PAYG
pension benefit (nortnative annuity), a benefit that equals about 93% of the benefit that
the fund member would have obtained had he not switched to the new system. For a fund
member the Private Pensions Guarantee Fund would top up his fund account should the
benefit  payment  at  any  time  after  his  retirement  fall  below  the  normative  annuity
calculated at the time of his retirement, or should the balance of his account at retirement
fall short of the normative funding need to provide the normative annuity.
The risk of the normative guarantee being called and thus the risk exposure of the
Private Pensions Guarantee Fund depends on three factors: the pension funds'  investment
performance, the benefit level in the PAYG  and the age and income distribution of the
pension  fund members. There is a high risk that the guarantee is called with respect to
those who opted for the second pillar above the age 45. In their case, pension fund returns
shall reach at least real wage growth plus 1.8 percent 9 on average for the guarantee not to
be called. At the same time, as even a rather  conservative estimate of future pension fund
returns  averages  around  1.5 percent  above the  expected real  wage  growth,  the fund
performance in the long term should not generate risk of the guarantee being called on a
large scale.
With respect to the age of fund member, the risk is higher for individuals who
have switched to the new system at a higher age, since they may not have sufficient time
to accumulate the required resources to meet the normative annuity and funding. Those
who switched to the new system at the age of 47 or higher will not meet the guarantee
eligibility criteria. Thus the largest risk is posed by individuals who have switched at age
41 to 47 years. To reduce the risk, government public awareness campaign has focused
on explaining the negative implications of  switching to the new pension  system at an
older age. The age distribution of fund members will not be know until the end of the
transition  period  (end  of  year  2000).  The  first  almost  one  million  fund  members,
however, shows a fairly reassuring picture: almost three fourth of the switchers is 35 or
younger, around 15 percent is 36 to 40 years and approximately 10 percent is 41 to 47
years.
Since the level of the normative annuity is linked to the pension benefit offered in
the first pillar of the pension system, the risk of the normative guarantee being called also
depends on the developments under the PAYG scheme. Changes affecting the benefit
level under the first pillar will directly affect the level at which the normative guarantee
For reference  see The World  Bank:  Hungary  Country  Economic  Memorandum  1999;  Fiscal
Chapter.  The calculation  is based on the assumption  that average  real  wage growth  equals  3
percent,  the average  return of pension  funds is above  real wage growth  by 1.5  percent,
administrative  cost  of pension  funds is 0.15 percent of the contribution  collected.  For income,  the
average  individual  wage profile  was used based  on historical  data available  at the Hungarian
social  security  funds.
13will be called. Members may also pay lesser attention to monitoring and comparing the
performance of the pension funds before deciding to invest, which may have a negative
impact on the behavior of pension funds. The fact that the normative guarantee can not be
called upon  within the next  15 years  allows the  Private Pensions Guarantee  Fund to
accumulate reserves and policy makers to further strengthen the guarantee framework.
The most significant risk to the Private Pensions Guarantee Fund emerges from
its  obligations under the normative guarantee procedure. To  deal with  fund short-term
liquidity problems, the Guarantee Fund will be lending to  the troubled  pension funds,
charging an administrative fee and penalty. Through this mechanism the Guarantee Fund
can set the cost of "borrowing" at above market level and thus ensure that it is only used
as a financier of last resource. Regulations need to be further elaborated particularly to
deal with the potential fund problem of long-term liquidity and fund reserve insufficiency
during the beneficiary annuity period.
The system  of guarantees  was not  based  on  cost-benefit analyses or  any work
aimed at sticking a price-tag on the system as a whole and its components. Uncertainty
surrounds  the  expected size, time-structure  and  likelihood  of  the possible  contingent
pension liabilities to be called. Table 3.1 summarises the types of financial obligations,
the determinants and reasons of uncertainty in forecasting  it. The year in  italic is the
earliest time when (under current legislation) the Fund may have to make payments.
Table 3.1  Contingent risks of the pension system
Reason of Obligation  Major determinants of its size  Unknown and undefined
and timing  variables
Frozen  assets at a pension fund  Size and concentration  of the market,  Short-term  growth of the market
- short-term  liquidity  problem  access to  liquidity, relative cost of
immediate  borrowing,
Frozen assets at a fund facing  Effectiveness of  supervision, long-  Asset valuation rules, bankruptcy and
long-term  liquidity  problems  term absolute  and relative of  funds,  liquidation  rules, indemnification  rules
immediate  size of the market
Normative  annuity  shortfall  Relative  age/income  structure  and  Age/income/entitlement structure  of
2013  earned  entitlements  of  switchers,  PAYG  pension  formula,
switchers  variability  of the actuarial  calculation  of
the annuity
Shortfall  of the separate  benefit  Flexibility  of  actuarial  revaluation  Actuarial  guidelines,  annuity  market
reserves  during  beneficiary  rules,  structure and  nature  of  the
period  annuity  market
2013
There is an explicit state guarantee  behind the Private Pensions Guarantee Fund
that ensures that the Fund will fulfil its financial obligations even if it has insufficient
reserves. It provides  financial backing to the second pillar  of the pension  system. This
guarantee is  the  core  of the  mechanism  explicitly  transmitting  the risks  of the  new
14pension system to the state budget. The technical aspects of the guarantee are yet to be
clearly defined in law.
To summarise, in the next 10-15 years, the main fiscal pressure will arise from the
transition deficits under the PAYG scheme rather than from the pension funds. At present
around  three-fourths  of  the  pension  funds  participating  under  the  second  pillar  are
concentrated in 5 big and several medium-sized funds, sponsored by well-known, mostly
international financial groups that, presumably, will vindicate their pension funds. The
government may need to  withhold some political pressure when  due to  shocks to  the
Hungarian stock market,  several bigger pension  funds may fail to  meet  the minimum
return criteria, and similarly, in cases of fraud and unforeseen shocks.
IMPLICIT  CONTINGENT  LIABILITY  OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
In most  countries, the  financial system  represents the most  serious contingent
liability of the government.  International experiences have indicated that markets expect
the government to help financially if stability of the financial system is at risk. In such
cases,  governments  are  compelled  to  intervene  financially  far  beyond  their  legal
obligation either to secure some critical functions of the financial system, or to protect
depositors and specific market agents beyond the limits of any state insurance schemes.
However, such practices further exacerbate the moral hazard problem in the financial and
corporate sectors.
Hungary  had  successfully restructured  most  of  the banking  sector by the  late
1990s. However, resolving the banking crisis has not been easy or straightforward, for
though  most  financial  institutions  are  privately  owned  and  have  strong  capital/asset
ratios, Hungary's first efforts to shore up its banking system did not entail privatization.
Although  faced  with  a  rising  volume  of  non-performing  loans  and  falling
capital/adequacy ratios, the large banks (in which the state held most of the equity) were
continued in operation by weak accounting practices or by infusions of public funds.
Privatization  as  a  remedy  was  applied  only  after the  government  spent  vast
subsidies on acquiring debt held by state-owned banks. To the extent privatization has
occurred, fiscal risk has largely been shifted to the new owners, some of which are strong
multinational  banks.  But  where  privatization  has  not  occurred  or  is  incomplete,  the
government  still  holds  significant  fiscal  risks,  some  of  which  have  burdened recent
budgets.
Reform of the banking sector unfolded in three stages, corresponding to the types
of instruments used, the degree of fiscal risk, and the transparency of public assistance.
The first, high-risk, stage began in the early 1  990s, with the liberalization of the economy
and  the  deterioration  in  enterprise  performance.  During  this  stage,  the  government
assumed most  of the risk of inability of firms to  service their bank  debt. The second,
medium-risk,  stage spanned the  1993-95 period, during  which bank  consolidation was
15emphasized and the capital position of banks was improved. The most recent stage has
been  characterized  by  a  substantial  reduction  in  government's  exposure  to  adverse
changes in the financial condition of Hungarian banks.
High risk: loan acquisitions
In  the  early  1990s, the  crisis  in the  banking sector mirrored  the crisis  in the
economy. Thousands of enterprises were unable to service their debt, Hungarian banks
had a rising volume of non-performing loans and a deteriorating capital adequacy ratio.
The  banks  needed an  infusion  of  capital,  which  given economic  conditions  and  the
structure of the banking industry'"  had to come from the government. During this period,
the government enacted a far reaching bankruptcy law, which sought to force insolvent
enterprises  into  bankruptcy  or  liquidation,  and  to  resolve  their  outstanding  debt.
Thousands of bankruptcies were filed and thousands of firms were  liquidated, but the
banks were not active participants in the process. Most of the liquidations were of small
firms, while most  of the bank debt was owed by large enterprises. In many cases, the
banks  rolled  over  maturing  loans  of  these  enterprises,  in  the  expectation  that  the
government would bail out the affected companies.  But rather than injecting capital and
requiring banks to clean  up their loan portfolios, the government  elected to acquire  a
substantial portion of the bad debt.
The effect was to transfer the risk from the banks to the government which ended
up with  significant losses on these transactions.  Financial risk  was heightened by the
manner in which  the loan acquisitions were made  and financed.  First, although  loans
were purchased at a discount, the purchase price typically  was a  fixed percent of face
value; it was not based on assessment of the quality of loans in bank portfolios. Second,
with  the  state taking  over  their  bad  debts,  the  banks  had  no  incentive  to  work  out
restructuring  or payment  terms with affected enterprises. Third, while a  portion of the
purchased  debt was  sold by  tender  or  restructured,  most  was  sold  to  the  Hungarian
Investment and Development Bank, transferred to state property agencies, or written off.
Medium risk: bank consolidation
Despite its  high  cost,  the  loan acquisition strategy  did not  resolve the banking
crisis. By the end of  1993, almost one third of the loan portfolios of Hungarian banks
were qualified, and an independent audit found that three of the five largest banks were
technically insolvent and that without new measures, their condition  would continue to
deteriorate. The govermnent realized that simply buying loans would not induce banks to
actively clean up their portfolios, improve lending and collection practices, or work out
bad debts. The fiscal risk had to be shared with the banks, but doing so required that their
financial position be strengthened through an infusion of capital.
t0  Most of the large  institutions  were predominantly  state-owned.
16The new program had two main elements: consolidation agreements between each
assisted bank and the Ministry of Finance spelling out the measures the former would
take to assess its financial condition, and developing work out units to resolve qualified
loans.  In  addition,  preparation  of  plans  for  remedial  action,  as  well  as  operational
improvement were required. The Ministry of Finance established a Bank Control Unit to
oversee  the  financial  institutions  and  monitor  compliance  with  the  consolidation
agreements. The bank consolidation scheme was mainly financed by HUF 165 billion in
20-year bonds; it succeeded in raising the capital adequacy ratio of the  assisted banks
from  0 percent  at the end of  1993 to  8 percent  a  year later. Bank  consolidation was
implemented in tandem with a Debtor Consolidation Program intended to accelerate the
resolution of enterprise debts, but the program had only limited success by the time  it
expired in 1995.
Low risk: the privatization strategy
Early appraisals of the bank consolidation program generally were favorable. Bank
supervision by State agencies tended to be weak, accounting standards were lax, and the
banks were slow to take up their new responsibilities. In retrospect, it is evident that these
startup problems were overcome as the government and the banks gained experience in
handling their new responsibilities. The direct fiscal cost of solving the banking sector
problems is shown in Table 3.2. The government has financed bank consolidation also
indirectly, through agencies such as the State Development Bank. However, compared to
the direct fiscal cost, the amounts of the indirect financing have been small.
Between  December  1993 and December  1996, qualified loans declined from 29
percent to  11 percent  of bank  portfolios.  With improved  balance  sheets,  satisfactory
capital adequacy ratios, and a stronger regulatory regime, it was feasible to privatize the
banks and to thereby shift virtually all explicit risk from the state to the new owners.
Most bank privatization occurred during the  1994-1996 period, as state ownership fell
from  67 percent  to  5 percent.  In some cases, the state retained a  substantial minority
stake, but most of these were subsequently reduced or sold off.
Privatization has been accompanied by  development of deposit insurance funds,
with premiums paid by banks held in reserve to  indemnify depositors against loss. The
buildup in the deposit reserve funds should suffice to cover losses if small banks fail, but
the state may still be at risk if a large bank were to get in trouble.
17Table 3.2  Fiscal cost of the banking problems 1991-98
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Bank  Consolidation  Bonds  0.0  0.0  285.6  47.0  6.0  9.0  -85.9  182.0
(changes  in  stock)  (HUF,  bn)
Guarantees  issued  10.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  16.5  27.8  44.0
(HUF,  bn)
Amortized  Bank  Consolidation  Bonds  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  85.9  0.0
(HUF  bn)
Interest  Paid  on  Bank  Consolidation  0.0  0.0  0.0  54.5  96.6  102.7  86.5  50.5
Bonds  (HUF  bn)
Guarantees  called  0.0  2.3  0.4  0.0  6.8  2.9  11.8  6.2
(HUF,  bn)  ___  _
Guarantees  recovered  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  1.1
(HUF,  bn)
Total direct  fiscal  cost  0.0  2.3  0.4  54.5  103.6  105.7  184.2  57.8
(HUF  bn)
Total  direct  fiscal cost  0.00  0.08  0.01  1.25  1.85  1.53  2.16  0.60
%  of  GDP  _
Source:  The Ministry  of Finance,  Debt Management  Agency
Note:  The bank  consolidation  cost  was  largely  financed  by  new  debt  issues  not  through  the budget  and
thus  did  not  affect  the  deficit  figures.  Total  fiscal  cost  is calculated  as  the  cost  of  the  bank  consolidation
program  (amortized  bonds  +  interest  payments)  plus  the  amount  of  guarantees  called  minus  guarantees
recovered.
The  1993 bank  consolidation  expenditure  of  over  8 percent  of  GDP partly  also  includes  debtor  (enterprise)
consolidation.
Postabank
Privatization has been the most  effective bulwark against the fiscal risk of bank
failure.  Nevertheless,  to  the  extent  that  privatization  has  not  been  completed,  the
government still is burdened by the need to assist troubled institutions. Postabank offers
the best contrast between containment of risk through privatization and risk through state
control (not necessarily ownership).
This bank was established in  1990 with capital contributed by the State Property
Agency. Unlike the other large banks, Postabank has not been majority state-owned in the
strict sense nor has it has been completely privatized" 1. The state's share in Postabank was
relatively small, only  16 percent, although large shareholders have included, quasi state
agencies  such as  the state-owned  Hungarian Post  and  the public  Health and  Pension
Funds. Postabank has been controlled by the state indirectly, via government influence on
the bank management. The main explanation offered by MOF officials for controlling it
is that Postabank has had a large retail base. Apparently, the government has not wanted
to control of this institution transferred to foreign hands.
The  average  state  ownership  was of more  than  70 percent  for  the five other  large  banks.
18Postabank grew rapidly during its early years, building up a strong retail business,
but in 1994 it still was relatively small, holding only about 5 percent of bank deposits and
7 percent of loans. Postabank had an aggressive growth strategy which made it Hungary's
second  largest  bank  by  1998.  However,  this  scheme  involved  risky  practices  that
weakened its financial position. The growth in its loan portfolio has not been matched by
increases in its  capital and in  1997, Postabank suffered  HUF3.8 billion  in  losses and,
following rumored bankruptcy, the withdrawal of HUF24 billion in deposits. To protect
the bank and depositors, the government has provided equity capital through the State
Privatization  and  Holding  Company  and  the  Hungarian  Development  Bank.  The
govermnent also has pledged HUF12 billion in guarantees to bolster depositor confidence
in 1997.
The true financial condition of Postabank was hidden from auditors, and possibly
from  the  government  as  well,  by  selling  non-performing  loans  to  a  separate  entity,
established with a loan from Postabank. The loan was recorded on Postabank's books as
an  asset, while the non-performing assets were  removed from  its books. This  enabled
Postabank to report that it was in sound condition, thereby postponing and making worse
the adjustment that would have to be made. The equity capital was provided at face value
or  higher, far  above the true value  of  Postbank's  shares would  have been  if  its  real
condition had been made public. Moreover, APVrt and the Hungarian Development Bank
supplied capital at the direction of the government; they had no discretion in the matter.
By using these institutions, the government was able to provide assistance outside the
budget.
This  assistance  could  not,  however,  rescue  Postabank,  and  in  late  1998, the
government in effect recapitalized Postabank by injecting approximately HUF 150 billion.
It  did  so in the  1999 budget (adopted  in December  1998) but  recorded this  as a  1998
expenditure. The effect was to make the 1999 budget look better in comparison with the
previous  year.  The  Postabank  rescue  package  was  also  complemented  with  a
compensation package in an amount of HUF 40 bn for the State Development Bank for
its losses on the share capital provided earlier that year to Postabank.
Postabank illustrates how state control over bank management adds to fiscal risk.
With state guarantee, be it implicit or explicit, to a bank, first, political considerations and
moral  hazard  in  the  bank's  decisions  increase;  second,  risk  is  concentrated  in  the
government and not diversified through a network of multinational banks; third, the bank
is more likely to suffer from lax management than those in which private owners hold the
risk;  fourth, the cost to  government is veiled by relying  on various  indirect financing
mechanisms  through  other  state-controlled  entities.  The  strong  probability  is  that
Postabank would be in sturdier condition today if the state had released it from political
networks and exposed it fully to market risk.
19Assessment
In the medium term, we do not expect the fiscal authorities to spend on the banking
sector. Some state  entities (principally the  State Privatization  and  Asset Management
Agency and the Hungarian Development Bank) still have an interest in some banks, but
not to a degree that would pose a fiscal risk. The cost of restructuring the banking system
in the 1990s has been high: approximately 12 percent of GDP. But the benefits also have
been high: reduced fiscal pressure on the state, a sounder relationship between banks and
enterprises, growing confidence in the banking sector, and more prudent accounting and
regulatory practices. At the present time Standard & Poor's  estimates the overall implicit
contingent government liability of the banking sector in Hungary at a favorable level of
less than 7 percent of GDP." 2
PRIVATIZATION  OF STATE  ENTERPRISES  AND CONTINGENT  FISCAL  RISKS
Privatization to contain fiscal risks
During  the  1  990s,  the  Hungarian  economy  has  been  transformed  from  state
ownership and control to one predominantly in private hands. Early in the decade, state
property  agencies  managed  approximately  2000  enterprises,  by  the  end,  almost
90 percent of their holdings had been liquidated or sold. At the onset of transition, the
state  or  entities  controlled  by  it held  approximately  two  thirds  of  domestic  wealth,
including  more  than  80 percent  of productive  assets. By  the  end,  well  over  half  of
Hungarian assets were privately owned, moreover, three  quarters of productive  assets
were in private hands.
However,  as  occurred in  the  banking  sector, privatization  of  state  enterprises
started  slowly  and  had  to  surmount  various  difficulties  before  it  was  implemented
wholeheartedly. Table 3.3 reports year-by-year revenues from privatization; it indicates
that half of the revenues were obtained in 1995-96. Before these years, privatization was
slow and halting. In fact, the government obtained more cash from privatization sales in
1995 than it had in the previous five years.
12  For comparison, the contingent fiscal cost of the domestic banking system is presently estimated by
Standard & Poor's at levels under 10 percent of GDP in Argentina, Italy, Poland, and Sweden, about
10 to 20 percent of GDP in Greece, Philippines, Singapore, Slovakia, U.K., and U.S. and over 30
percent of GDP in China, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and
Taiwan.
20Table 3.3  Privatization revenues during 1990-98 (HUF bn at current prices)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Cash  0.7  31.4  77.2  169.9  139.8  481.0  176.1  301.7  99.2
Liquidation  17.7  39.8  31.7  32.1  29.0  12.6  5.0  15.5  0.0
Asset Transfers/Other  154.0  0.0  17.5  41.1  19.6  91.2  20.0  26.8  0.0
Divestiture Total  172.4  71.1  126.4  243.5  188.5  584.9  201.1  344.0  99.2
Divestiture Total,  8.3  3.1  4.3  6.9  4.3  10.4  2.9  4.1  1.0
%  of GDP  I_  _  I_  _  I_  _  I_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Source: The APV Rt. and MOF.
Note:  The cash amounts  are not adjusted  for devaluations  which  occurred  during  this period.
1990-94:  Slow  Privatization.  Privatization  began  largely  as  a  "spontaneous"
process,  with  thousands  of  companies  started  by  spinning  off  viable  parts  of  state
enterprises  into  new  entities.  Spontaneous  privatization  was  swift,  but  it  was  not
transparent,  nor  did  it  always  safeguard the  state's  interest.  There  were  widespread
charges of abuse and favoritism, and whether warranted or not, they led to a slowdown in
the transfer of state assets to private owners. Although many enterprises were liquidated
(often by  being transferred  to  new  owners)  during  this  period,  most  were  small  or
medium-size firms; the biggest enterprises (in  energy, communications,  and transport)
which accounted for the bulk of state assets, still were publicly owned. By the end of
1994, the state property agencies had divested only about 35 percent of their initial state
equity holdings.
In divesting enterprises, the government took several strategic decisions which may
have slowed the process but enhanced adjustment to a market economy. Privatization was
to  be  case  by  case, not  wholesale,  as  in  other transitional  countries.  Moreover,  the
government opted for cash sales, rather than vouchers and other non-cash transactions.
Each enterprise had to be  evaluated and managed, and a tender prepared for each. To
stabilize state enterprise and enhance their sales value, the property agencies spent time
and money restructuring viable entities. In the preparation for privatization, the property
agencies contributed capital, or offered guarantees. Even when assets were privatized, the
state often continued to be implicated in the enterprises. In some cases, the government
policy  required  the  state  to  retain  an  ownership  share;  in  others,  the  state  held  or
guaranteed enterprise debt; in a few cases, the property agency took back the company
when the new owners were unable to make it a going concern.
1995-96:  Accelerated  Privatization.  As  Table  3.4  indicates,  1995  was  the
turnaround year in Hungary's  privatization strategy. The government  decided to move
ahead with divestiture of some of its largest holdings. To spur the process, it enacted a
new  law that consolidated responsibility  for  divesting and managing  state  assets in  a
single agency" 3,  made  the  process  more  transparent,  required  the  agency to  provide
written explanations of its decisions, and generally reduced the state's  residual share in
privatized firms.
'3  Privatization  was entrusted  in 1990 to a new state property agency; subsequently, a second agency,
holding many of the largest companies, was established.
21More than 80 percent of the revenue earned from privatization in 1995-96 were in
cash (or cash-like) transactions. A portion of the money went  to pay  the expenses of
privatization, but most was used to repay foreign debt. Around HUF 100 bn of it has been
used to supplement the budget each years (see Table 3.4).
Table 3.4  The use of privatization revenues 1990-98 (HUF bn at current prices)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Budget  support  and  debt  0.5  22.4  51.5  57.5  151.7  368.4  122.9  254.8  39.0
repayment
Transfers to Municipalities  0.0  2.3  4.8  3.4  6.0  6.1  21.6  26.4  0.0
Direct privatization costs  0.0  1.1  6.2  7.6  25.3  33.6  33.0  36.1  46.3
Reorganization expenditures  0.0  0.0  8.7  49.5  8.0  9.8  16.8  12.1  13.5
Guarantees  0.0  0.0  5.8  7.8  7.0  3.7  33.2  16.0  51.6
The use total  0.5  25.8  77.0  125.8  198.0  421.6  227.5  345,4  150.4
The use total,  0.02  1.12  2.62  3.55  4.54  7.51  3.32  4.1  1.5
%  of  GDP  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Source: The APV Rt. and MOF.
Note:  Out of the amounts on budget support and debt repayment, HUF 150 bn and HUF 100 bn in 1995
and 1996, respectively, were used to support the budget.
Continuing obligations and contingencies
Current government  policy is that to the extent feasible,  divestiture should be  a
clean transaction, with no  remaining state obligations. Thus, the state property agency
does not warrant the future performance or financial condition of privatized entities, nor
does it indemnify the new owners for the cost of meeting rising environmental standards.
Nevertheless, the state property agency does have a number of ongoing commitments and
risks  either  predating  privatization  or  arising  out  of the  sale  of  assets.  The  agency
maintains reserve funds to cover various contingencies and is confident that these will
suffice to protect the government against any call on the budget.
In describing the ongoing risk held by the privatization property agency, it is
useful to  distinguish between those which are independent of the privatization process
and those which are directly linked to the divestiture of assets. The former includes assets
still owned by the state, asset management guarantees and bank and enterprise equity.
State  Owned  Assets.  By  early  1999,  the  state  property  agency  has  held
approximately  250 companies with  estimated total  equity value of HUF560  billion.  It
expects  to  divest  approximately  HUF200  billion  through  future  privatizations,  but
anticipates  that  the  remaining  assets  will  remain  under  state  control.  The  state  will
continue  to  be  at risk for the performance of these  companies,  and with  all of them
managed by a single agency, the risk of cross subsidization is substantial.
22Asset  management  guarantees  have  been issued  by  the  current  state  property
agency or its predecessors in cases where the enterprise has not been able to borrow on its
own account. These loans have been used to  finance restructuring  of state enterprises
prior to privatization; they generally have been fully collateralized. This type of guarantee
was much more common prior to 1995, and they rarely have been called.
Equity.  Although  it has  guaranteed enterprise  debt, the  state property  agencies
generally have not lent money to cover enterprise losses. But they have purchased shares
in banks (such  a Postabank)  and in  some instances, enterprises  in need of  additional
capital. While these equity infusions obviously increase financial risk, they also enable
the state to benefit from improvements in the performance of the assisted enterprises. Of
course, if the condition of the enterprises deteriorates, or if their  performance is weaker
than might occur if the enterprise were in private hands, the government and the economy
will bear the costs.
Commitments Contracted Pursuant to Privatization
In  privatizing  assets,  the  government  divests  the  risks  associated  with  their
performance. But in order to consummate the transfer of assets, the state property agency
often has  to provide various  assurances  (see Box  1.) concerning the commitments  or
condition  of the assets. The state property agency maintains a reserve fund (HUF38.8
billion in 1997 and HUF44 billion in 1998) to cover the various guarantees. The fund is
financed  by  privatization  revenues.  The principal  risks  covered  by  the  reserves  are
environmental  guarantees  (HUF15  billion)  and  due  diligence  (HUFlO  billion).  The
agency believes that the reserves have been based on conservative assumptions and that
there is little likelihood that the state will have to make good on any of its guarantees. For
example, the  reserve  for  environmental  liabilities  assumes  that  half  of the  property
agency's guarantees will be called.
23Box 1: Privatization Guarantees Contracted by the State Privatization Agencies
Ownership. The state property agency warrants that it is the owner and has legal authority
to sell the property on behalf of the state. These generally are low-risk guarantees.
Due diligence. The state property agency guarantees that it has accurately stated the
financial condition and pre-existing obligations of the entity. In view of the due diligence exercised
in the course of privatization, these also have been low risk.
Financial status quo. Most privatizations are time consuming transactions that take as
much as half a year or more from audit of the company until closing. In some cases, the property
agency, usually at the behest of the buyer, conducts a second audit at closing and indemnifies the
buyer for material deterioration of condition. This type of guarantee has become quite rare.
Undisclosed environmental liabilities. The state property agency warranties that the
property to be sold is of a certain environmental quality. It agrees to pay for any environmental
damage that was not stipulated or revealed at the time of sale. The warranty does not cover the
accumulated costs of past environmental damage or the cost of meeting higher future standards.
The guarantee is either for a fixed amount or for an agreed percentage of the contract's value. The
total stock of outstanding environmental guarantees was HUF20 billion in 1998.
Evaluation
In addition to generating revenues and limiting risk, privatization has contributed
to fiscal adjustment in several ways. It has  spurred the government to broaden the tax
base and improve tax collection; it has permitted reductions in state subsidies; and it has
enabled the government to repay a substantial portion of its foreign debt. Privatization is
now limited to the dwindling stock of enterprises still owned by the state.
Although the privatization process has nearly been completed, the state still is at
risk with respect  to the performance and  financial condition  of certain enterprises, in
some cases  because it is still the  owner, in others  because it has retained  a minority
interest, and  in  some  because it has  guaranteed various  elements of the  privatization
process. The State Privatization and Asset Management Agency will retain and manage
various assets, including institutions in which government has a financial interest. In this
capacity, it will retain income from cash flow and privatization, and possibly use some of
this money to finance some risks off-budget. While this development is in its infancy and
might not mature into routine practice, it bears close observation.
In general, measured against the overall structure and condition of the Hungarian
economy,  these risks  generally seem to  be  prudent  and  well managed,  and  it is  not
expected that the government will incur any significant expenditure due to unexpected
problems in the enterprise sector.
24CONTINGENT EXPLICIT  RISK  OF  STATE  GUARANTEES AND STATE-GUARANTEED
AGENCIES
During  transition,  Hungary  has  removed  enterprise  subsidies  and  direct  state
interventions in the markets, replacing them to some extent by state guarantees and other
indirect, off-budget, market-stimulative programs.  For this  purpose,  as  in many  other
countries around the world, in addition to  issuing individual state guarantees, Hungary
established several specialized credit and guarantee agencies to support development and
investment programs by providing credits and guarantees. These institutions largely rely
on their  own financing  but  also are guaranteed by  the  state and  supported  from the
budget. Annual additions to the amounts of outstanding state guarantees and of liabilities
and outstanding guarantees of the credit and guarantee agencies  are in  most instances
subject to ceilings specified in the annual budget law.
Hungary's  government  has  been  relatively  prudent  in  issuing  guarantees  and
allowing for state-guaranteed institutions. It has implemented several simple measures to
reflect contingent  explicit  liabilities  in  fiscal  analysis and  expenditure  planning.  The
government  consolidates  the  full  list  and  calculates  the  total  face  value  of  state
guarantees, requires sectoral analysis of risks prior to issuing a  guarantee, and  applies
ceilings on the amounts of guarantees issued. To mitigate moral hazard in the market and
better control fiscal risks, the government however has to recognize the importance of
risk  sharing,  and  good  surveillance  under  its  programs  of  contingent  support.  For
example, so far the government has guaranteed the full value of an asset subject to a state
guarantee against all  risks, without any  risk-sharing  mechanisms  under  the guarantee
contract. Box 2 summarizes the legal provisions for dealing with guarantees.
25Box 2: Dealing with Government Guarantees: The Public Finance Act, 1992
The Government may extend individual guarantee for purposes specified in, and on the
expense  of  the  annual  budget  law.  It  is  entitled  to  guarantee  loans  of  international
financial institutions, as well as to guarantee and to reinsure guarantees of specific legal
entities.
The amount of individual guarantees  issued for specific purposes (such as, supporting
reorganization of certain industries, guaranteeing deposits established before 1993) within
a  fiscal year is limited as a ratio of total budgeted state revenues. Guarantees may be
undertaken also in excess of this percentage limit for strategic activities (such as filling
energy reserves) with Parliamentary approval defining the amount of guarantee issue. In
case of  guarantees to  cover loans  of international financial  institutions, the  individual
contracts  set the limits for the guarantee. Guarantees and reinsurance to entities whose
activities are prioritized  by economic policy (such as promotion  of export,  small and
medium  size  enterprises,  investments  in  agriculture)  are restricted  up  to  a  measure
specified in the annual budget law as a lump sum. The following institutions are eligible
for state reinsurance: the Hungarian Export-Import Bank Co., Hungarian Export Credit
Insurance Co., Credit Guarantee  Co., Rural Credit Guarantee Foundation Co.  and the
Hungarian Development Bank Co.
The issuance of guarantees shall be reported to the State Audit Office. Its size, amount,
conditions, type,  and the justification  for it as well as information  on the  lender and
borrower shall be  made public in  a Government  resolution.  The economic actor to
whom the guarantee is issued is responsible for presenting an unbiased justification  for
the issue and assessment of the probability of default, of the chances of recovery. The
supporting  sector  Minister,  together  with  the  Minister  of  Finance,  submits  to  the
Government its request for guarantee in a form of a draft Government resolution.
After  the respective  sectoral  ministry  and the  sectoral  department  in  the  Ministry  of
Finance has assessed the expected defaults, guarantee is issued, the issue is outlined in
government resolution, and this resolution becomes part of the next year's  budget law.
For  each  explicit  contingent  liability  the  annual  budget  is  required  to  show  the
probabilities  of  default  and  the  expected  payments  due.  In  the  final  account,  the
government is required to report any payments related to calls on contingent government
liabilities.
26The MOF,  assisted  by  the  State Debt  Management  Office, is  responsible  for
monitoring the  government's  risk  exposure vis-a-vis  state guarantees  and  reinsurance
programs for credit and guarantee agencies. As a rule, state guarantees cover all risks and
the entire value of the underlying asset. This appears to be a result of creditor pressure on
the government. Most credit and guarantee agencies extend partial credit guarantees, thus
covering only a  share of the underlying asset. The government  covers the risk of the
credit and guarantee agencies by partial state re-reinsurance up to 70 percent on average.
State guarantees and credit and guarantee agencies do not presently pose a threat
to fiscal stability. On the policy front, enterprise privatization has alleviated the pressure
on the government to guarantee credit issued by former state-owned enterprises. On the
institutional front, the government's practice to budget for a provision for state guarantees
and  for  credit  and  guarantee agencies  generates  an  ex-ante  estimate  of  their  overall
implicit subsidy makes it visible in the budget and thus positively affects the incentives of
policymakers  in dealing  with  nonbudgetary  support programs.  Together with  the low
ceilings on newly guaranteed amounts of state guarantees and on obligations of credit and
guarantee agencies, if sustained, this practice will prevent guarantees and these agencies
from seriously threatening fiscal stability in the future.
The use of guarantees in Hungary, however, is problematic in the allocative and
operational  sense.  While  some  guarantee  programs  pursue  justifiable  development
objectives, others merely conceal the true nature of state involvement. A positive example
of revealing the true nature of guarantees relates to one of the individual guarantees. The
Hungarian  State  Railways  have  been  known  for  their  repeated  reliance  on  state-
guaranteed loans of an annual average of HUF 20bn taken for operational purposes in the
period of 1992-1995. The Railways have partially defaulted on their borrowings in 1994
and  1995 requiring  thus  more  budgetary  resources  than  the  government  considered
allocating  to  the  Railways  on  the  basis  of  the  strategic  priorities.  Moreover,  the
government had to take over the Railways obligations to commercial banks that had been
subject to worse terms than the sovereign debt. The government has recognized that the
cost of supporting the Railways had been higher than envisaged and that a subsidy would
deliver the objective at a lower cost than a state guarantee, hence when it took over the
Railways debt stock, it closed a contract specifying ex ante the size and forms of further
state support.
The performance of government guarantees and credit and guarantee agencies has
been affected by the crises in  Asia and  Russia. The actual fiscal  cost related to  state
guarantees  and  state-guaranteed  institutions  remained  under  the  budgeted  figures
throughout most of the 1990-97 period both in terms of guarantees issued and guarantees
called. There  have been two  exceptions.  During  1991, the  government  increased  the
ceiling  for  new  guaranteed  issues  from  0,5  percent  to  3  percent  of  budgeted  state
revenues. And,  in  1992 the  actual issues  exceeded the  ceiling  of 2  percent  of  state
revenues by 1 percentage point. Turmoil in the international financial markets in 1998 has
27not  resulted in calls  on state guarantees to  an extent higher than  expected. Moreover,
while  the  MOF  has  slightly  increased  the  1999  appropriation for  potential  calls  on
guarantees in order to prepare for the emerging losses due to the Russian crisis, it has left
the ceiling for the issue of new state guarantees at its 1 percent (of revenues) level in the
1999 budgeted.
Guarantees with annual limits
Individual  guarantees.  The  ceiling  on  the  total  face  value  of  newly  issued
individual guarantees has been defined by the Annual Budget Laws in the range of one to
three percent of budgetary revenues in the past nine years. Higher ceilings characterized
years  1990-1994. In this  period, state guarantees were directed particularly to  support
specific  industries.  Privatization  has  reduced  the  demand  for  and  redirected  state
guarantees.  State  guarantees  have  increasingly  covered  several  troubled  banks
(Postabank),  enterprises  and  small  farmers,  while  specialized  credit  and  guarantee
agencies have expanded primarily to support exporters and small and medium enterprises.
The amounts of new guarantees issued dropped to one percent of budgeted state revenues
in 1997. Each year until 1998, individual guarantees have required the largest government
outlays out of all the types of contingent government liabilities called. These incorporated
payments for loans of companies in coal, steel, machine and agricultural branches as well
as  providing  support  to  cleaning  portfolio  of  certain  commercial  banks.  The  sharp
increases  up  to  HUF13.5bn  in  1997  and  a  budgeted  24.7bn  in  1998  are  mainly  a
consequence of government's decision to cover part of the losses of a Postabank.
Strategic reserves. Beyond  the ceiling, individual guarantees are issued rarely.
Such rare cases mainly relate to purchases of strategic reserves  and unique legal cases
such as loans of an enterprise established by a central budgetary agency. Their maximum
amount is usually determined by the Parliament.
Guarantees  to  the public.  These  state  guarantees  cover  bonds  issued  by  the
former local councils and council companies prior to 1987, as well as deposit guarantees
for deposits placed in domestic financial institutions prior to the creation of the National
Deposit Insurance Fund in  1993. While there have been regular calls on these types of
guarantees, their amounts have been low (an average HUF 0.3bn per annum in the 1991-
97 period), dropping in real terms, and recoverable (almost HUF  0,1bn per year). The
amounts still  outstanding  are  low and  diminishing.  Also, privatization  of the  former
council companies that had been issuing bonds prior to transition  reduced fiscal risks.
Meanwhile the National  Deposit  Insurance Fund has  built own  reserves  for potential
threats to  deposits,  and has  obtained state-guaranteed access to  loans from  the central
bank and other financial institutions.
Credit and guarantee agencies
28Eximbank.  For Eximbank, the state provides a  guarantee up to  an outstanding
stock of HUF 75bn in  1998. The state is also the owner. Eximbank  extends long-term
loans and issues guarantees on behalf of the state with the objective to support Hungarian
export activities. Until 1998, the state guarantee was called once, in 1996, in the amount
of  HUFlbn.  Audited  balance  sheets  imply  that  Eximbank  is  a  fast-growing  and
financially  sound  institution. In  1997, Eximbank  assets  reached  HUF  36bn, up  from
HUF13.6bn in 1996. The exposure of Eximbank to Russia, approximately HUF 3bn, may
somewhat deteriorate its performance and increase its calls on the state budget in  1998-
99. While only 5 percent of  Hungary's exports go to Russia, 20 percent of Eximbank's
portfolio is in Russian guarantees. The Eximbank's practice is to mark loans to market, so
that its portfolio is revalued each year to reflect changing market conditions. Eximbank
expects to draw HUF 1.5 bn from the 1999 budget.
Export-Import  Insurance  Company  (MEHIB)  MEHIB operates  as  a market-
based  credit and investment insurer covering either political or commercial risk." 4 The
government is the owner of MEHIB and reinsures exclusively against political risks taken
by MEHIB. There is  an annual ceiling the amount of MEHIB-insured  assets that are
covered by  the  state  reinsurance.  The  ceiling  has  been  rapidly  increasing  since the
establishment  of  MEHIB,  reaching  HUF  185bn  in  1998.  Similarly,  MEHIB  has
increasingly utilized this ceiling from 36 percent use in 1995 to 66 percent in 1997.15  The
limit has been raised to HUF250 bn for 1999,  with a 44 percent utilization rate.
In  its  audited  balance  sheets  MEHIB  has  reported  slight  profits.  The  recent
explosive increase in new  insurance issued by MEHIB may, however, raise its  future
costs. MEHIB's credit insurance goes to relatively high-risk transitional countries, as part
of  government  policy  to  support  trade  with  these  countries.  In  its  geographical
distribution,  MEHIB  is  exposed  45  percent  to  CIS  countries  (around  HUF  22bn  to
Russia), which  may negatively  influence MEHIB's  performance  in  1998-99. MEHIB
suggests a provision of HUF 5.6bn for its possible 1999 claim on the state budget.
Credit  Guarantee  Co.  The  state  reinsures  70 percent  of  the  obligations  that
emerge from  guarantees issued by  the Credit Guarantee  Co., up to  70 percent  of the
company's reserves. The legal ceiling on guarantees outstanding is HUF 55bn in  1998.
Shareholders of the Credit Guarantee Co. include mainly commercial banks and saving
cooperatives.  Guarantees  issued  by  the  Credit  Guarantee  Co.  partially  cover  credits
mainly to small and medium sized enterprises. The state budget paid relatively modest
HUF 326m on guarantees triggered in 1997. In 1999 however, there are expectations of a
total call of HUF 1.8bn due to the budget re-insuring a wider range of business activities
of the company (risk capital investments) than before.
14  MEHIB  is also insuring  Eximbank's  guarantees.
15  Turnover  data show a significantly  smaller  involvement  in insuring  against  political  risks.  Use of the
statutory  limit is measured  in terms of negotiated  deals  rather  than actually  closed contracts.
29Rural  Credit  Guarantee  Foundation.  The  state  reinsures  70  percent  of  the
obligations  that  emerge  from  guarantees  issued  by  the  Rural  Credit  Guarantee
Foundation,  up  to  70  percent  of  the  Foundation's  reserves.  The  legal  ceiling  on
guarantees outstanding is HUF33bn in 1998. The Foundation is under the supervision of
the Ministry of Agriculture. The guarantees cover 50-80 percent of the underlying credit
of an  average  5-year maturity.  The value  of  guarantees triggered  was HUF172mn  in
1997. There are expectation  of  a total  call  of HUF  600mn  in  1999, as the types  of
businesses reinsured by the state budget increases.
State Development Bank  (MFB) A state guarantee to MFB  applies to  foreign
loans and bond issues and has a ceiling of HUF80bn in 1998. The owner of the MFB is
the  state. MFB  concentrates  on  domestic  long-tern  lending  and  investment banking
activities. Since 1992, MFB has participated in the consolidation of Hungary's  banking
sector and carries a small amount of bad assets payable to the Ministry of Finance. Assets
reached HUF92 and 160 billion  in  1996 and  1997 respectively, partially as MFB  was
directed to  inject  money  into Postabank,  even though  this  did  not  comport  with  its
ostensible mission.  As  a  consequence, the  government  was compelled  to  recapitalize
MFB by the end of 1998.
Summary of contingent liabilities outstanding
One measure that may improve the performance of projects under state guarantees
would  be to  strengthen  the mechanism for  sharing risk  between the  government  and
parties in  guarantee contracts.  Moral hazard and the probability  of default in  projects
under a guarantee are high if the guarantor insures the whole rather than a part of the
obligation, and all risks rather than selected political and/or commercial risks.
For state guarantees and the credit and guarantee agencies, Table 3.5 estimates the
contingent government liability outstanding in 1998 and the value at risk. The estimates
reflect the existing ceilings, the nature of risks associated with the guaranteed programs
and  the  expected economic  developments.  We estimate  the  total  contingent  liability
related to state guarantees and credit and guarantee agencies in the neighborhood of HUF
400bn in  1998. On flow basis, we expect that the  1999-2001 budgets may be called to
cover approximately HUF 50-60 bn annually on these programs.
30Table 3.5  Contingent government liability outstanding, value and risk by 1998
Liability Ceiling  Liability  Risk  Value at risk




Individual Guarantees  25*  120  30  40
(within  % limit)
Individual  Guarantees  64**  37  5  1.8
(beyond  %  limit)
Guarantees to Activities of Specific Institutions
State  Development  80  50  2.5
Bank
Eximbank  75  50  7  3.5
MEHIB  - Export-  185  110  8.8
Import  Insurance
Company
Credit  Guarantee  Co.  39  20  5  1.0
Rural  Credit  23  10  5  0.5
Guarantee
Foundation
TOTAL  n.a.  397  n.a.  58.1
Notes: The table excludes guaranteed loans from international financial institutions.
* The 1998  ceiling  on the  issue of new guarantees.
*  Total amount  of individual  guarantees  beyond  the percentage  limit.
CONTINGENT  IMPLICIT  RISK  OF LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  OBLIGATIONS
As a result of the political liberalization process in Hungary, every settlement is
entitled to establish its own governing body. Consequently, almost every municipality in
Hungary has its own local assembly: there were 3200 local governments in the country by
mid-1998, with  an  average number  of  3000 inhabitants.  The Hungarian  Constitution
entrusts all local governments with freedom from political and economic interference by
the central  government. Nevertheless, the  local  governments'  economic freedom  was
implemented in a way that suppressed the principle of transparency in the use of public
moneys and the fact that the central government remains ultimately responsible for many
local government obligations. This issue was addressed by the Parliament enacting two
precautionary standards: a cap on local government borrowing and municipal bankruptcy
law.
Since  1990,  nine local  governments have  gone  bankrupt,  mainly  because  they
overestimated their financial capacity to repay loans. Local governments had taken these
loans  mostly  to  accomplish  public  utility  investments  and  to  undertake  special
31entrepreneurial activities. As a general rule, these municipalities have not been bailed out
from central budgetary resources. In  1996 the government passed an act on municipal
bankruptcy. This act did not so much change but formalized bankruptcy procedures and
explicitly limited the exposure of the central government to local government fiscal risks.
The law declares that the priority in dealing with local government financial problems is
continuous service delivery. It forbids collaterization of core local government assets and
central budgetary transfers for local government loan repayment. Under the bankruptcy
procedure, a local government is require to repay its debt from own revenues (including
asset sales). Until 1998, only  one of the local governments under bankruptcy has had
outstanding liabilities larger than assets.
Risks related to service delivery arrangements
Local governments in Hungary, independently of their size, are made responsible
by  law  for  a  wide  range  of  services.  They  are  responsible  for  the  provision  of
kindergarten care, primary education, public health services, social assistance, drinking
water, public lighting, and for the maintenance of public roads and cemeteries. As the
mandated services are diverse and the size of the serviced areas is often very small, the
provision of services is fragmented and costly, without realizing economies of scale. In
addition, local governments commonly offer a number of other, non-compulsory services,
such as sewage system, public transportation, housing, public cleansing, contribution to
energy supply, participation in local employment. Local politicians only rarely undertake
the political pain of reducing the non-compulsory services.
Local  governments  in  Hungary  extensively  depend  on  central  government
resources: the proportion of budgetary transfers (current and capital) is around 70% of the
total revenues. Local taxes represented a small part of total revenues in the early 90s (5%
in 1993), though they gained importance as a result of squeezed budgetary resources after
1995 (10% by  1997), but the ratio of total own revenues, such as institutional revenues
and various fees has remained constant over time. Once resources are transferred from the
central budget, however, local governments are independent from the central government
in  spending  according  to  their  own priorities.  The  lack  of  earmarking  of  budgetary
transfers  to  specific  activities  reflects  the  high  level  of  political  and  economic
independence of local governments granted by Constitution.
Several  symptoms  show that  there  is  a built-in  systemic  inconsistency  in  the
current  inter-government  finance  structure  and  responsibility  assignment.  Local
governments can obtain a 'deficit grant' to deal with financial difficulty that is not caused
by their own fault. The number of local governments applying for this additional grant
during the budgetary year has increased significantly over time, and was almost 25% of
municipalities by 1997. The total amount of the deficit grants remained about HUF 6 and
7bn respectively in  1996 and  1997. However, the number of instances  shows that the
local government structure is inadequate to supply all the compulsory services because of
inefficiencies in service provision. (The roots of these inefficiencies will be discussed in
the institutional  section below.) Another problem relates to the amortization of assets,
32which has not been properly incorporated in local spending decisions, and to the renewal
of assets, which has been repeatedly postponed on a common basis. For example, in the
health sector where a majority of hospitals is owned by local governments, the stock of
the deferred renovation of buildings and replacement was estimated to be around HUF
140 bn by the end of 1997.
To  ensure  more  efficient  operations,  the  central  government  has  established
financial  incentives  in  several  areas:  10%  more  central  government  resources  are
obtainable  by  municipalities  for  schooling or public  utility  services in  case of joint
service delivery. Although these incentives have had a modest impact on rationalizing
service delivery, the process of establishing joint arrangements is rather slow. The central
government has abstained from using major administrative force with the objective to let
the system evolve. While this approach is justified on political grounds, the evolution of a
more efficient system could be lengthy, and hence, also costly for the central government.
Meanwhile,  local  governments may  cover current operations  through  increasing  their
dependence on the central budget either explicitly (by increasing their applications for the
deficit  grant)  or  implicitly  (by  accumulating  arrears,  neglecting  maintenance  and
depleting assets).
Risks related to investment financing at the local level
A majority of local government investments is financed through state transfers for
investment  purpose  (addressed  and  targeted  subsidies)  with  matching  own  financial
resources  of  local  governments.  Until  1994  local  governrments covered  their  own
financial share primarily by borrowing from the bank sector (without sovereign guarantee
of the central government) and bond issues. Local government had obtained assets in the
privatization process. 16 From  1995 onwards, as the central government introduced a cap
on local borrowing, local  governments have replaced borrowing by asset  sales. Local
governments have also used the proceeds from asset sales for debt repayment.
In the longer run, the combined effect of the borrowing cap and of the gradual
depletion of marketable  assets will inevitably limit local investment activities.  Unless
local  governments  increase  their  own  revenues  and  deliver  efficiency  gains  in  their
operations,  their  infrastructure  development  may  extensively  depend  on  the  central
budget.  Local  investments  with  high  priority  (e.g.  sewage  systems  due  to  the  EU
accession requirements) may need to be taken over or by the central government, and
unfinished high-priority investments will need to be completed from the central budget.
Moreover, a shortage of own resources and the lack of ability to co-finance investments
would disqualify many local governments from applying for the EU structural funds. The
government has estimated that, following its EU accession, Hungary may be eligible for
structural funds in the amount of approximately 2 percent of GDP annually. As the lowest
16  Their assets have included the housing stock initially owned by the state and former local
councils,  companies  established  by the former  local councils  as well as state companies  utilizing
the land in the territory  of municipalities.
33co-financing requirement is around 20%, local governments will need to contribute about
0.5 percent of GDP for projects to utilize the structural funds.
The question that Hungary should resolve in the inter-government finance thus has
several levels. First the central government needs to reconsider incentives, particularly
with respect to the mechanism of budgetary transfers to local governments. Second, the
central government needs to improve the mechanism for allocating investment funds to
local governments. Third, the central government needs  to improve  its  monitoring  of
financial management (including asset management) of local governments. And finally,
after these steps are completed, the central government should reconsider how to regulate
the access of local governments to the financial markets and possibly increase the local
government borrowing  cap. While  any  obligations  of  local  governments  increase the
fiscal risk vis-a-vis the central government, too low a cap on local government borrowing
may produce sub-optimal results as well, particularly in during the EU accession process.
THE HEALTH FINANCING LIABILITY
An open-ended state guarantee
As many other European countries, Hungary provides an unlimited state guarantee
that all citizens have access to adequate health  care. The central government explicitly
guarantees that  health  services are provided  even if  revenues of  the health  fund  fall
behind the planned  anount.1 7 Data in  table  3.6 indicate that  in  every year  since 1992
actual expenditures  and the  deficit have  been above  budgeted levels.  The guarantee,
however, generates moral hazard in the health system, reduces incentives toward cost-
reduction and efficiency, and is a source of persistent financial imbalance in the health
system.
This  problem  arises  particularly  because  the  shift  from  tax-based  to  health
insurance-based financing has not been completed, the mechanism for health investment
decisions is not transparent, and many structural problems in the health system remain
unresolved. Moreover, health care cost is expected to increase rapidly with the political
pressure  to  apply  state-of-the-art  technology  and  new  medications,  and,  similarly  to
pensions, with population aging in the next fifty years. The benefit package guaranteed
by the  state appears increasingly non-affordable.  Coupled with  budgetary  constraints,
financial tensions appear both at the macro and the micro level.
The national Health Fund has continuously run higher-than-expected deficits since
its establishment in 1992 and has year after year drawn on additional budgetary resources.
On  a  regular  basis,  revenues  have  been  falling  short  of  and,  more  significantly,
expenditures have been surpassing the planned amounts. The expenditures of the Health
Fund  have  been  mainly  driven  by  higher  than  expected  disability  and  sick  pay
17  Act 80/1997 on Eligibility of Social Security Services and Private Pension, and Their Financing
34expenditures in the first half of the 90s, by increasing pharmaceutical expenses, and by
extra wage increases of health sector employees.' 8 The continued increase on these fronts
has not been off-set by any  observable productivity gains,  and thus indicates that the
current institutional and incentive structures of the health care system are flawed. Table
3.6 shows the budgeted balance and actual deficits of the Health Fund for  1992-97. In
addition, hospitals have accumulated a large debt in the past few years, rolled on from
one year to another. 19
Table 3.6  Deficits of the Health Fund 1992-1998
Health Finances  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Budget  Actual  Budget  Actual  Budget  Actual  Budget  Actual  Budget  Actual  Budget  Actual  Budget  Actual
Revenues  238  235  271  280  336  380  436  423  490  465  521  481  573  574
HUF bn
Expenditures  238  257  287  306  336  398  436  445  491  509  525  537  595  621
HUF bn__  ___  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  __  _
Deficit  0  -22  -17  -26  0  -18  0  -22  -1  -44  -4  -56  -22  -47
H U F bn  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
Deficit  0  0.7  0.0  0.7  0  0.4  0  0.4  0  0.6  0  0.7  0.2  0.5
% of GDP  _
Source:  Ministry  of Finance
Policy, institutional and demographic risks
The increasing deficits and arrears in the system can be expected to  continue. In
absence of any major reform, the present system is not sustainable for three main reasons.
First,  related  to  policy,  the benefit  package  is  large if  at  all  limited,  pharmaceutical
expenditures are rapidly increasing, salaries of doctors and other health employees  are
lower than sustainable while the number of doctors remains very high, and eventually,
amortization of health infrastructure will need to be covered. Second, on the institutional
front, the responsibility and accountability of the Health Fund are not well defined in
operational  spending  nor  are  local  government  obligations  clearly  articulated  in
18  According to the national wage agreements, part of the wage increases should be financed through a
downward adjustment of the number of employees in the sector. The wage appropriations for the laid-
off personnel could be used for wage increase of others. This arrangement has had a limited success
for the past few years, hence wage increases resulted in increasing deficits.
19  With the exception of 1992-93 when the Health Fund deficits have been financed from a special bond
issue by the central government and written off by end of each fiscal year.  The deficits of the Health
Fund have been particularly meaningful since 1997.  Until 1997 the social security system employed
an opaque cross-financing mechanism. For example, the Health Fund paid for pension contributions
of people on child care leave while the pension fund financed health care for disabled under
retirement age. Moreover, until 1998, the Health and Pension Funds reported directly to the
Parliament and State Audit Office, bypassing the government oversight.
At the end of 1996, the government launched a hospital debt consolidation program.  This program
required HfUF4  bn from the state budget in 1997. Despite the effort to reconcile systemic difficulties
at the hospital levels, however, the Final Account for year 1997 indicates that hospitals have
accumulated new debt during the same year. The 1998 budget made separate appropriations to cover
hospital debt, which can hardly be seen as a one-for-all rescue program.
35investment spending. The third problem is demographic. The cost of health care for an
individual  increases  sharply  with  age.  As  the  share  of  elderly  in  the  population  in
Hungary is increasing, the overall health cost will also continue to rise for the foreseeable
future.
Assuming  that  the  present  policies  will  continue  without  increases  in
pharmaceutical expenditures, wages  and investments, we can realistically estimate the
annual deficits of the Health Fund to stabilize around 0.7 percent of GDP until 2010.
However,  if  the  likely  increases  on  the  three  accounts  (pharmaceuticals,  wage  and
investment) realize, the deficits may be expected around 2.1 percent of GDP by 201020.  In
this scenario, the net present value of the Health Fund net deficits until 2010 is around 20
percent of the  1997 GDP. 21  For the entire health system, also considering health care
revenues other than those collected by the Health Fund, this scenario would imply that
deficits will be gradually increasing from about 0.7 percent of GDP in 1997 to 1.9 percent
of GDP in 2010.
The Health Fund is mainly in charge of financing the existing arrangements. The
Health Fund does not play a significant role either in defining services that are needed
and affordable or in selecting efficient providers. This limited role forestalls efficiency of
the  entire health system.  Unlike the Pension Fund, which  is just  transferring pension
benefits of a pre-determined level, the Health Fund could, if it were a real purchaser of
services, significantly affect the cost of health care in Hungary.
Indirectly, given its overall health care guarantee, the government also bears the
risk that local governments will fail to adequately maintain health  facilities they own.
While  the  ownership  of  health  facilities  has  been  with  local  governments,  local
govermments have  to  compete  for  investment  funds  from  the  central  budget.  The
allocation of resources  for investment, however,  does not  fully reflect the investment
needs.  This may cause investment needs to  accumulate and health  facilities to  fail in
some localities.
Even though  institutional  reform in  the health  system would  produce efficiency
gains, the demographically and policy-related increases of future health care costs, will
inevitably produce increasing government liabilities in the future. Thus, the government
needs to incorporate its increasing health liabilities into its medium-term  fiscal analysis
and  consider policy reforms  to  improve the purchasing  function of  the Health  Fund,
harden the budget constraint in health sector, to some extent at least limit the universal
benefit package, and enhance the incentives of the public and private agents acting in the
health system.
20  Depending  on the GDP  growth  rate chosen,  the Health Fund's deficit  might  vary between  2.1-2.5%  of
GDP by 2010. For reference  see Hollo,I.  Long,M  Papp,A.;  Health Care  Financing  in Hungary
(Background  paper for Health  Financing  Conference  October 16-17,1998  (Manuscript)
21  Depending  on the discount  factor  chosen  the result  varies between  20-23%  of the 1997  GDP.
364.  MANAGING THE BUDGET AND FISCAL RISKS
During  the  socialist  era, public  resources  generally  were  allocated  on  the  basis  of
multiyear  economic plans  rather than  annual  budgets.  The principal  function  of  the
budget was to  implement  approved plans 22, not  to  establish government  policies  and
priorities.  During the transformation of  the Hungarian economy, central planning has
been de-emphasized and budget decisions have become more prominent. During the first
years  of  transition,  the  budget  management  system  failed  to  secure aggregate  fiscal
control and even to provide information about the ways public moneys were spent.
Since 1996-1997 the government had strengthened the role and competence of the
Ministry  of  Finance  in  economic  and  public  management  and  established  a  modern
Treasury equipped with advanced information and control systems. Since then the MOF
has effectively taken the lead role in fiscal adjustment and the management of the central
budget  and  off-budget government  obligations;  leading the  process  of  annual budget
allocation in coherence with macroeconomic forecasts, overall policy priorities and basic
principles  of  fiscal prudence.  The  State Treasury has  became responsible  for budget
execution, making all government payments from a single account,  controlling ex-ante
any  such payment  against  budget  appropriations,  and recording  them  in  the  general
ledger. Extrabudgetary funds (other than the social security funds) have been restored to
the  budget.  These  steps  have  limited  the  scope  for  overspending  and  misuse  of
government funds and-by  keeping the cash centrally available at the single account and,
thus, reducing public  borrowing needs,-have  improved the  efficiency of government
cash management. 23
Ahead  of  many European  countries, Hungary  has  been  expanding  its  budget
management system to address contingent government liabilities. State budget proposal
makes provisions  for the main  sources of potential  financing pressure  on  the central
government (such as individual guarantees or reinsurance extended to  various agencies
operating on behalf of government).  The official 3-year fiscal forecast includes expected
outlays on contingent government liabilities. State Debt Management Office reports the
full list  of  state guarantees  from  a  comprehensive database  of  public  liabilities, and
reviews the terms of new guarantee contracts.  MOF submits to the Parliament reports on
the  potential  cost  of  both  newly  considered  and  existing  programs  of  contingent
government support, and audited balance sheets of state-guaranteed agencies.  The State
Audit Office is authorized to review government activities under both direct spending and
contingent support programs, the adequacy of budgetary provisions  and reserve funds
with respect to risk exposure, and the management of contingent as well as direct explicit
liabilities. National Bank of Hungary has expanded its monitoring of potential fiscal risks
in the private sector. In inter-government finance and the banking sector, regul-atory  and
22  To a somewhat  lesser extent  than in other  central  European  countries,  but much more  than in the
OECD  community.
23  For detailed  discussion  on budget  management  reforms  see Bokros  and  Dethier, 1998.
37enforcement mechanisms have been strengthened to minimize any residual fiscal risks.
These measures  have effectively  limited the  government's  use  of  contingent  support
programs and thus also the government's exposure to off-budget risks.
Initially, it was primarily  a political  decision to  finance the cost  of transition,
including bank consolidation programs, through the budget and direct public debt, rather
than through any special purpose vehicles outside the budgetary system, and to manage
government  obligations  transparently.  For  the  future,  it  is  mainly  the  principles  of
transparency  and  budgetary provisioning  for  contingent  government  liabilities  in  the
public  finance  management  system  in  Hungary,  which  reduce  the  likelihood  that
policymakers  would  indulge  in  pursuing  partial  interests  through  hidden  forms  of
government  support,  such  as  contingent  government  liabilities  and  expose  the
government to major hidden fiscal risks.
An adequate institutional system requires that the government treat any non-cash
program involving  a contingent fiscal risk  like another budgetary or  debt item.  Most
importantly,  the system has  to make  the potential  fiscal cost  of off-budget programs
visible ex ante. Accrual-based budgeting and accounting systems help fiscal discipline
but  are  neither  sufficient  nor  necessary  in  their  entirety.  Disclosure  of  full  fiscal
information  is  most  critical.  Disclosure  of  face  values  of  contingent  government
liabilities, also, enables the markets to analyze and measure the fiscal risks and thus,
indirectly,  assist  the  government  in  its  risk  assessment.  Rules  on  the  use  of  state
guarantees and insurance programs, and on the behavior of state-guaranteed and public
agencies and subnational governments, are critical.
Fiscal Discipline
In striving for accession to the European Union, the government must be mindful of
the  impact  of  current  spending  commitments  on  future  deficits.  MOF  has  taken  an
important step by compiling the legal and other commitments that may entail additional
expenditure over the next three years. The list is quite detailed and explicit, though yet to
be published. It includes the cost of fulfilling pension obligations under pension reform,
recent legislation, and the expenditures that may result from political commitments. For
policymakers to identify, classify, and understand the full range of fiscal risks is the first
condition for fiscal stability.
In  1999,  to  strengthen  future  fiscal  discipline,  the  government  formalized  its
medium-term strategy by establishing a fiscal framework for each of the next three years,
and included  contingent government  liabilities in  fiscal analysis. The three-year fiscal
framework is  now  required to  show  more  clearly  what  are the  medium-term  fiscal
implications of government decisions that either involve public expenditures or create a
contingent government liability. If done correctly, fiscal analysis thus factors in the cost
of implicit  subsidies provided by contingent support programs,  including the potential
future claims on public resources from arrears and other obligations of state- guaranteed
and owned institutions.
38To minimize future outlays on contingent government liabilities, the government
needs to further elaborate its tools, procedures and capacities in analyzing and dealing
with risks on program-by-program basis. The existing rules for guarantees, government-
guaranteed agencies and other off-budget obligations are effective in  limiting the total
face value of contingent government liabilities. But the system is weak to minimize the
likelihood of contingent govermnent liabilities being called and the size of public outlays
required when they are called. Specifically, before the government adopts a program of
contingent  support, it needs  to  analyze the  attributes  of the  underlying risks,  factors
influencing the size of these risks, and the incentive mechanisms of the parties under the
program.
On the basis of such analysis, the govermment  can design the program that would
still  deliver  the desired outcomes but  minimize  the  government's  risk  exposure.  The
objective would be particularly to  expose the govermment only  to those  risks that are
beyond control of the parties under the program and that would spread the potential cost
of the program between the government and the beneficiaries. Under a state guarantee,
for instance, the  government would identify and  cover in the  guarantee contract only
selected risks and a part rather than whole of the underlying asset. With respect to the
autonomous agencies, such as the State Development Bank or Export Import Insurance
Company  MEHIB,  the  govermment should  strengthen  the  financial  and  managerial
accountability  of their  staffs by  remunerating  sound risk  analysis and  early warning
signals rather than short-term profits of these agencies.
Strategic Allocations
Much of the budget is allocated on the basis of normative standards that purport to
measure service needs. Approximately one quarter of central government expenditure are
in the form of grants to local governments, and more than 75 percent of these grants are
formula-based.  Thus,  a  community's  population  strongly  influences  the  number  of
hospital beds budgeted  for it, the number of beds  determine staffing levels, staff size
determines  the  amounts  granted  by  the  central  government  to  localities.  Normative
allocations have several advantages: they simplify formulation and implementation of the
budget; they  reduce the need for information on programn  impacts  and  service needs.
When budget shares are decided by formula rather than through  political  negotiation,
conflict is abated and decisions can be taken expeditiously.
But  normative  rules  rigidify  budget  allocations,  weaken  the  capacity  of  the
government  to  allocate  on  the  basis  of  its  strategic  objectives  and  priorities,  and
complicate the task of fiscal adjustment. The normative rules have the effect of creating
entitlements, propping up spending and employment levels, generating diseconomies of
scale, and reducing the government's  ability and willingness to reallocate across sectors
or local governments in accord with its assessment of need and on the basis of evidence
on  program  effectiveness.  Normative  allocations  tend  to  rigidify  over  time,  as
beneficiaries mobilize to protect their budget shares. The formulas devised for one set of
39governmental conditions still are used when needs and priorities  change. Reallocation,
which is hard to do under normal budget conditions can be virtually impossible when the
funds are parceled out under old formulas. In Hungary, the government compensates for
normative grants by distributing supplemental funds to local governments on the basis of
its priorities rather than preset rules.
Inasmuch  as  budget  allocations  also  the  programs  of  contingent  government
support in  Hungary tend to  reflect bottom-up norms  and pressures rather than clearly
relate to policy priorities  and specific results. A guarantee extended on credit taken by
Postabank or the State Railways, for instance, tends to be a result of "emergency"  and
eminent political pressure rather than a strategic decision to support certain outcomes at a
given price and to expose these institutions to hard budget constraint. Particularly when
programs  of contingent support are discussed separately from  the budget process, the
government  may  end  up  pursuing  objectives  of  lower  priority  through  potentially
expensive  guarantees,  after  it  had  made  cuts  that  endanger delivery  of  services  and
outcomes of a higher priority in the budget.
The government has  made initial  steps toward  linking its  expenditure decisions
with the cost of delivering specific services and accomplishing specific policy objectives.
This is the direction of institutional development, which has been implemented in the EU
countries  and,  also,  which  would  facilitate  Hungary's  spending  choices  in  the  EU
accession process. In an improved system, the Cabinet and Parliament would define the
inter-sectoral priorities, the Ministry  of Finance would set  sectoral ceilings  on budget
allocations and contingent support programs to reflect the priorities, and line ministries
would receive more control to determine the spending and contingent support programs
in their sectors. To truly compare the expected cost of government support across sectors
with  the  inter-sectoral  priorities,  the  ceilings  on  spending  and  guarantees  and  other
contingent support program would be added up for each sector.
Ideally each sector would be subject to a  single ceiling that would include both
budgetary  expenditures  and  the expected  outlays on  guarantees  and  other contingent
support programs in the sector. The ceiling would thus apply to the expected cost of all
government  activities  in  the  sector. For  guarantees  and  other  contingent  government
liabilities, the ceiling would have to reflect the net present value of their future expected
cost.  The  sector ministry  could decide  on the  mix  of  direct  and  contingent  support
programs.  The  contingent  support  programs,  however,  would  be  subject  to  risk
assessment and approval by the Ministry of Finance and the Debt Management Office.
When approved, guarantees and other contingent support programs would still be issued
through the Ministry  of Finance. The net value of the expected future cost would  be
deducted  from  the  sector  ministry's  budget  allocation  and  transferred  to  a  central
contingency  reserve  fund,  which  would  exclusively  serve  to  cover  government
obligations ensuing from the approved and reported contingent government liabilities.
Such  budgeting  mechanism  creates  disincentive  to  use  fonns  of  contingent
government support excessively. Contingent government liabilities create uncertainty in
40the future public  financing requirement, which has a negative value particularly  if the
government of Hungary cannot yet fully rely on unlimited favorable access to borrowing
and good risk management capacities, and if it has low risk preference. 24 The Treasury
would be  best  placed  to  manage the contingency reserve funds. In  the medium-term
framework, the annual ceilings, mix of direct and contingent support programs and the
reserve funds would be set for 3 years ahead.
To  improve  financial  and  managerial  accountability,  financial  information  on
inputs (wages and material cost) available through the Treasury would be complemented
by information on cost  and  results  of government programs.  Improved accountability
would, in turn, allow the introduction of performance-based contracts in the civil service
and  managerial  freedom  in  delivery  of  government  services.  To  further enhance  the
quality  of  information  needed  for  public  finance  performance  management,  the
government would gradually accept accrual accounting standards and produce balance
sheet including commitments, fiscal risks, assets and liabilities, and contingent liabilities
in  its  reports.  A  well-developed  budget  system,  with  procedures  for  establishing
programs, bidding for resources, and assessing results will be a necessary condition for
switching from normative grants to discretionary allocations.
Operational Efficiency
Not only do normative rules impede reallocations, they also diminish the incentive
of  central government  agencies,  funds and  local  governnents  to  be  efficient  in  their
activities, and make it more difficult to rationalize the provision of government services
and  reduce  the  size of  public  employment.  Hungary's  very  large  public  work  force
strongly indicates the embedded inefficiency of public services. One out of every four
workers is employed in the public sector, particularly in education and health sectors, in
which the normative rules tend to  stiffen overstaffing and underpayment. It appears that
the government has been more willing to restrain pay than to take the hard decisions on
shrinking the  public  services. This  and  similar  dilemmas  would be  mitigated  by the
intended move toward a more performance-oriented public management system, in which
allocations are based on relative costs and the recipient's results.
The move toward  a performance-oriented public management system that would
link budget allocations with govemment results would create incentives in government
agencies to improve their operational efficiency and thus most likely produce savings in
the amount of government employment and in the total wage bill. Improved incentives
can, however,  deliver  better  efficiency only  if  the  government  strengthen managerial
skills  in departments, introduce  systems of internal control, and  identify  and measure
outputs well. In view of the importance of local governments in delivering services, it is
important  that  managerial  improvements  extend  to  them  as  well.  Although  fiscal
24  Reserve  funds partly  reduce  the potential  harm when  contingent  liabilities  fall due,  but raise other
problems. Therefore,  volatility  in the financing  requirement  and impact  on the overall  government  risk
exposure  should  be considered  in the design  of government  programs.
41decentralization  and  the prominence  of  nonnative  grants  have  weakened  the  central
government's capacity to dictate local management, the central government should use its
leverage as the main source of local revenues to prod them to improve efficiency, prune
employment levels, and budget on the basis of performance.
Aside from the rules, it is above all the capacities required particularly on the side
of the Ministry of Finance, State Treasury, State Audit Office and, also, line ministries to
identify, analyze, manage and prevent risks. The government must be able compare the
cost  of a  subsidy with the expected cost of a guarantee or other form of  government
support  in  order  to  choose  the most  efficient program  to  deliver  the  desired  policy
support. For example, ad hoc credit guarantees are not likely to be the most efficient form
of government support to a permanently loss-making enterprise like the State Railways.
In addition, programs  of contingent government support, such as guarantees, to deliver
the desired outcomes while minimizing  its future fiscal cost, require the expertise  and
skills of risk analysts and financial managers rather than civil servants to be prepared and
administered  well.  For  instance,  the  guarantee contract  has  to  emerge  from  a  good
qualitative  and  quantitative analysis  of  the  underlying  risks  and  outline  an  efficient
mechanism for risk sharing between the government and the covered parties.
Summary of Measures To Reduce Fiscal Risks
Table  4.1  lists  systemic  measures to  promote  understanding  of  fiscal  risks  by
policymakers, the public and  markets. Table 4.2  summarizes specific steps  to control
fiscal risks on a program by program basis.
Table 4.1  Systemic measures
Fiscal Policy  Public Finance Institutions
. consider full fiscal performance beyond  . cover  the  sources  of  all  potential  public
the budget and debt  outlays
. identify,  classify and  analyze  all  fiscal  . apply a joint  ceiling on the expected cost of
risks in a single portfolio  contingent and direct programs in each sector
*  determine the government's  optimal risk  *  disclose  the  full  fiscal  picture,  beyond  the
exposure and reserve policy according to  budget and debt
its risk preference and risk management  . monitor,  regulate and  enforce  disclosure of
capacity  risks in the public and private sectors
42Table 4.2  Measures for individual programs
Fiscal Policy  Public Finance Institutions
Before accepting  Before accepting
. assess how the fit with policies  . evaluate the risks,  estimate the  potential  fiscal
*  consider financial risks  cost, and set additional reserve requirement
•  announce  the  program  limits  so  to  . design  the  program  well  to  minimize
minimize moral hazard  government risk
*  design hedging strategy
When accepted  When accepted
. stick to the pre-set limits  *  budget, account and disclose the risk
. transfer additional funds to the reserve fund
. monitor the risk factors and reserve adequacy
*  regularly adjust hedging strategy
When to be executed  When to be executed
*  execute within the pre-set limits  . compare and report the actual fiscal cost versus
*  if implicit, assess the fit with policy  the estimates, evaluate performance and punish
priorities  and  desired  market  for failures
behaviors
5.  SUMMARY OF FISCAL PRESSURES  AND NEXT STEPS
The Government of  Hungary has contained the  major fiscal  risks of  transition.
Particularly, it paid-off and resolved most problems in the banking and enterprise sectors.
Clearly, since 1995 the Government has implemented fiscal adjustment with the objective
of long-term fiscal stability rather than immediate deficit target. The pension reform has
been the main result of this approach, raising temporary deficits but reducing the long-
term public pension liability. A single sector awaiting for reform in order to protect future
fiscal stability is the health sector. Although the levels of government spending, budget
deficits, and public  service have remained high, the government  has made significant
progress in rationalizing public expenditures and improving the management of budget
and off-budget fiscal risks.
In the process of transition, the government has been taking on new fiscal risks.
These mainly  include state guarantees, and  growing programs  of credit and  guarantee
agencies operating on government behalf to  support industries first and exporters more
recently, following privatization. The government has dealt with these new programs of
contingent government  support in a  prudent and transparent  manner. Ceilings on  and
reporting of the risks have been reasonable. Similarly, the normative pension guarantee
43applied  in the process of the pension reform is unlikely to pose major threat to future
fiscal stability.
In  the years  ahead,  however,  Hungary  is  likely  to  face  pressure  for  additional
spending,  as the implications  of the  recent turmoils  in  the financial markets  surface,
pressure grows to  improve various  services and  as population  ages.  Table  5.1 offers
estimates of the main fiscal pressures in the medium-favorable scenario.
Table 5.1  Estimating pressures on state budget (% of GDP)
1999  2000  2001
Health deficit  0.7  0.7  0.7
Pension PAYG deficit  0.3  0.3  0.3
EU requirements*  1.7  1.7  1.7
Local government claims  0.05  0.05  0.05
State guarantees  __  _  _0.3  0.25  0.25
MEHIB  0.08  0.03  0.02
Eximbank  0.03  0.02  0.01
State Development Bank  0.02  0.02  0.02
Credit Guarantee Fund  0.01  0.03  0.01
Rural Credit Guar. Fund  0.01  0.01  0.01
Total  3.2  3.1  3.1
*  Conservative  estimate  for annual  additional  investment  requirement  to meet  EU environmental
standards  in a 20 year  period.
The objective of EU accession makes future fiscal stability rather than temporary
deficit reduction increasingly important. Thus, in establishing its agenda for the future,
the government should concentrate on reducing the remaining fiscal risks of its policies
and on building institutional capacities to  deal with  risks in the future. On the policy
front, health  financing reform, continued check on hidden subsidies provided  through
guarantee programs,  and determining the government's  optimal risk  exposure  are the
priorities.
On the institutional front, the aim should be  for a more flexible and  responsive
budget  process,  in  which  the  government  has  enhanced  capacity  to  maintain  fiscal
discipline outside as well as within the budget, prioritize allocations of public resources
and risk, and promote efficiency in central and local government operations. Particularly,
the government may wish to build its capacities to analyze fiscal risks in the medium-
term  fiscal frarnework, build  a more result  oriented budget  management  system,  and
enhance the mechanisms of  sharing risk  between the public and  private  sectors under
government programs.
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457.  ANNEX
PUBLIC LIABILITIES: How  BIG A PROBLEM IN HUNGARY?
A Set of Questions
The whole picture: coverage
1. What are the major risks to future fiscal stability? Fill the table below with  specific
items.
These include direct borrowing, guarantees,  institutions that are  covered by some
type  of  government  guarantee,  state  insurance  programs,  and  all  government
commitments to spend or intervene financially  in the future. In the classification think
of  direct liabilities  (which are considered an  obligation of  the government  in any
event)  and  contingent  liabilities  (which will  be  considered  an  obligation  of  the
government ifa particular event occurs), each of which can be either explicit (defined
by a law or contracts) or implicit (broadly pre-determined by public expectations and
pressures by interest groups).
46Liabilities  Direct (obligation in any  Contingent (obligation if a particular event occurs)
event)
Explicit  *  foreign and domestic  *  state guarantees for non-sovereign borrowing and
sovereign borrowing  obligations  issued  to  subnational  governments
(loans  contracted  and  public  and  private  sector  entities
Government  and securities issued  (development banks)
recognized  by  central  *  umbrella  state  guarantees  for  various  types  of
by  a  law  or  government)  loans (mortgage loans, student loans, agriculture
contract  *  expenditures  by  loans, small business loans)
budget law  *  trade and exchange rate guarantees issued by the
*  budget  expenditures  state
legally  binding  in  *  guarantees on borrowing by a foreign sovereign
the  long-term  (civil  state
service salaries, civil  *  state guarantees on private investments
service pensions)  . state  insurance  schemes  (deposit  insurance,
minimum  returns  from  private  pension  funds,
crop  insurance,  flood  insurance,  war-risk
insurance)
Implicit  *  future recurrent  cost  *  default of a subnational government, and public
of public investment  or  private  entity  on  non-guaranteed  debt  and
A  "moral"  projects  other liabilities
obligation  of  *  future  public  *  liability clean-up in entities under privatization
Goverbiment  pensions  (as  *  banking failure (support beyond state insurance)
which mainly  opposed  to  civil  *  investment failure  of a  non-guaranteed pension
whreflects  service  pensions)  if  fund, employment fund, or social  security fund
public  not required by law  (social protection of small investors)
expectations  *  social  security  . default of central bank on its obligations (foreign
and pressures  schemes  if  not  exchange contracts, currency defense, balance of
by  interest  required by law  payment stability)
groups  . future  health  care  . bail-outs  following a reversal in  private  capital
financing  if  not  flows
specified by law  *  residual  environmental  damage,  disaster  relief,
I  military financing, 
The liabilities listed above refer to the fiscal authorities, not the central bank.
2. Is there a precise legal delineation of the public sector (for example in the form of a full
list of public sector agencies) and government responsibilities?
Ifyes,  note the definition and/or reference to appropriate legal documents.
47Selected risks
1. State-guaranteed institutions and directed credit
. List  all  institutions  that  fulfill  orders  of  government  to  extend  financing  to
enterprises, banks,  agencies  of any kind,  or households. Provide  their balance
sheets and statements of contingent liabilities.
*  What type of  government  support do these institutions  receive?  (for example,
privatization  revenues,  cheap  financing  via  central  bank,  state  guarantee  on
borrowings)
Try to draw a diagram showing the institutions involved in directed credit and the
financial and cross-supportingflows.
2. Guarantees
*  List all government guarantees, their issuer (the MOF versus another government
agency)  beneficiaries, creditors, face values, the type of  risks and  their shares
covered, currency of denomination, risk estimates if any.
3. State-owned enterprises and banks
. List all large state-owned enterprises and provide their audited balance sheets and
statements of contingent liabilities.
. List  all  large  state  owned  banks  and  provide  their  audited  balance  sheets,
statements of contingent liabilities, and risk-assessment of assets.
Recording and reporting: transparency
1. For each type of direct and  contingent liabilities you identified  in the table above,
register the institutions responsible for final approval, recording, monitoring, and data
consolidation.
2. Which institutions can instantaneously retrieve from their databases up-to-date figures
of the items listed below. Which documents report such figures? What is the time lag
in reporting?
*  sovereign  debt  portfolio  (breakdown  according  to  maturities,  currencies  and
interest-rate types)
*  debt service profile for the next months and years
*  guarantee  portfolio  (breakdown  according  to  guaranteed  institutions,  sectors,
currencies)
*  the total face value of all state guarantees
48*  the total sizes of state insurance schemes
. the  total  sizes  of  reserve funds  associated  with  guarantees  and  state  insurance
schemes
. private foreign and domestic borrowing
*  sector allocation of foreign credit
3. Which sources of fiscal risks are, according to your view, not reported to:




*  foreign investors
*  public
Institutional arrangements: accountability
1. Are there any legal requirements on the government to estimate, account and report the
future  fiscal costs  associated  with  its  budgetary policies  and  off-budget promises
(such as guarantees and other contingent liabilities)?
No
Yes - in the budget process
when the government is called to pay
when cash is transferred
other:
2. Which of the liabilities that you identified in the table are not regulated by any law and
depend fully on ad hoc government decisions?
3. Describe or provide references for:
*  state guarantees: the requirements for their design (the type of risks allowed to be
covered,  the  extent  of  required  risk-sharing),  issuance  (only  the  MOF  is
authorized?), government control mechanism (required reports from the creditor and
beneficiary, audit and valuation requirements), and realization mechanism if they
fall due.
*  subnational  governments,  public  sector  agencies  and  enterprises,  and  state-
guaranteed institutions: the financial management and reporting requirements and
government control mechanism.
. demands  on  government  to  extend  an  ad  hoc,  previously  unforeseen  financial
support:  the  legal  requirements  and  practice  for  the  deliberation  process  in
government decision making.
494. Is the government legally required to explain the amounts of public liabilities?
No




1. When considering alternative policy choices and forms of government support (such as
direct  provision  and  financing  versus  guarantees),  do  the  Ministry  of  Finance,
Cabinet, central bank or Parliament:
*  quantify the future fiscal cost of alternative options in a single medium-term fiscal
framework?
*  describe the risks of alternative options?
2. As it appears, in which areas and under what circumstances is the government expected
by the public or by interest groups to provide financial support beyond the budget?
3. List  examples  when  government  withstood  political  pressure  and  did  not  provide
financial support above the budgeted figures? (For example, when the government
refused to solicit financial support for a failed enterprise or bank.)
4.  Are  public  enterprises  and  banks,  state-guaranteed  institutions,  and
creditors/beneficiaries under state guarantees "rewarded" and "punished" according to
their management of risks?
Provide examples.
Risk management:  capacities
1.  Describe  the  capacities  of  the  MOF,  other  government  agencies,  public  sector
institutions  and enterprises, and state-guaranteed institution to  evaluate and  control
the risks of government programs and contingent liabilities.
2. Describe the process of designing a state guarantee or state insurance program.
3. How is the required size of the government reserve fund pre-determined?
4. What steps does the MOF and other agencies undertake to prevent fiscal risks arising
from the public and private sectors? (For example, are any actions taken if enterprise debt
or central bank obligations appear to high?)
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